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ABSTRACT
FROM FRANKENSTEIN TO MATRIX: CULTURAL PERCEPTIONS OF
CYBORGS
SANDRA SCHATZ 
UNIVERSIDADE FEDERAL DE SANTA CATARINA
2002
Supervising Professor: Sérgio Luis do Prado Bellei
What man’s mind can create, man’s character can control.”
Thomas Edison
This work deals with the literary genre of science fiction. Combining the 
principles of “Cultural Criticism” and “Reader-Response Criticism,” it discusses and 
interprets two Westem narratives: Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein and The Wachowski 
Brothers’ The Matrix. It is concerned with two major issues: (1) Westem culture’s 
overwhelming reliance on science and technology and (2) the role of narratives as an 
instrument of both strength and defy in regard to the values and truth proposed by the 
dominant or paradigmatic cultural discourse.
Number of pages: 115
Number of words: 32.176
RESUMO
Este trabalho lida com o gênero literário de ficção científica. Combinando os 
princípios do “Cultural Criticism” e “Reader-Response Criticism,” ele d^cute e 
interpreta duas narrativas ocidentais: Frankenstein de Mary Shellew^e Matríx dos
irmãos |Wachowski. O trabalho se preocupa com dois aspectos relevantes; (1) a 
profunda dependência da cultura ocidental em relação à ciência e à tecnologia e (2) o 
papel das narrativas como um instrumento de apoio ou de mudança em relação aos 
valores e verdades propostas pelo discurso dominante.
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INTRODUCTION
Twentieth Century Westem society and culture are distinguished by a heavy 
dependence upon technology and science laced with a fimdamental secular belief in both 
progress and, as the quotation from Thomas Edison used in our epigraph suggests, man’s 
ability to master them. We call this belief the “Westem technological creed.”
Technological dependence has increased in a fast pace since the age of the hidustrial 
Revolution and deeply changed society and culture. Narratives have changed accordingly. 
Westem society has produced an increasing number of narratives -  literary works, cultural 
studies, films, comics, videos, computer games, and theme parks -  that simultaneously [1] 
express the ways culture deals with technology, imagine its outcomes, and conceive of their 
impact on human life, consciousness, behavior and society, [2] create composite beings 
half-human, half-machine (the cyborgs) to embody these cultural concems regarding 
technology, and [3] reveal the ambiguous way in which our culture deals with the Westem 
technological creed. We call these narratives -  that deal with the ways in which machines, 
computers and the human body and mind have been imagined and that discuss the Westem 
technological creed -  as cyber-literature. We understand that cyber-literature comprises 
narratives of the science fiction genre as well as philosophical treatises and cultural studies 
on the essence and impact of technology upon mankind.
This dissertation is concemed with cyber-literature, the fictional beings, and the 
actual beings it creates: its cyborg personae and its “cyborg-minded” readers. I intend to 
understand how cyber-literature constmcts its subjects, what messages it conveys, how they 
are understood by its audience, and how they affect the way its audiences see and conceive
of both the world in which they live and the role technology plays in it. In other words, I 
am questioning the status of cyber-literature in society and culture: is cyber-literature as a 
narrative a reinforcement or a challenge to the fundamental secular belief in technology, 
science, progress and men’s ability to master them? Is it a reinforcement or a challenge to 
the Western technological creed? In addressing these questions, I will also be discussing 
whether one can or cannot find in cyber-literature a kind of guiding dominant or an 
unchanging master-narrative. If there is a dominant master-narrative guiding most of 
science fiction genre, it must be examined in the way it affects our culture and society.
I
I understand narratives in the sense proposed by Scott Bukatman in his Terminal 
Identity. Narratives are “acts of emplotment” that permit “imaginary resolutions of real 
contradictions that are crucial conduits of ideological suppositions”, render reality 
meaningful and cognoscible, and offer “a structure that provides connectives in the form of 
causal relations, sequentiality, and most importantly the teleological satisfaction of an 
ending, a final steady state through which all other elements will retroactively assume a full 
significance” (Terminal Identity 106). Besides, I am using the concept of the “dominant” in 
the sense that Bukatman appropriates it fi'om Roman Jakobson. Thus, “the dominant may 
be defmed as the focusing component of a work of art: it rules, determines and transforms 
the remaining components” (Terminal Identity 161). As Bukatman explains, “the dominant 
is not the sole characteristic of a text, but, it exercises a determining influence over the 
rest,” and, indeed, it serves “to guarantee some structural integrity” (Terminal Identity 162). 
Finally, I am employing the concept of master-narrative to refer to a narrative that 
“structures our understanding of the social structure” and guides the operation of social 
hQ%Qmony (Terminal Identity 106).
The concept of hegemony was originally defined by Antonio Gramsci. Gramsci 
employed it to describe "the spontaneous consent given by the great masses of the 
population to the general direction imposed on social life by the dominant fimdamental 
group." He developed the concept of hegemony in his analysis of political domination as a 
historical concept, a process, never fixed and always in the making. He conceives of that 
domination as simultaneously requiring force and consent. Force is applied in subduing or 
eliminating enemies or opposing forces; consent is built in the acquisition of support fi-om 
allied groups through compromises in which the hegemonic group recognizes and takes 
into account the interests and the tendencies of the groups over which hegemony is to be 
exercised. Li his view, the normal exercise of hegemony “is characterized by the 
combination of force and consent, which balance each other reciprocally, without force 
predominating excessively over consent. Indeed, the attempt is always made to ensure that 
force will appear to be based on the consent of the majority."*
This concept of hegemony parallels both the currently prevailing notion of culture 
and Michel De Certeau’s concept of strategy. On the one hand, social sciences and cultural 
studies have replaced the traditional concept of culture, in which a whole society was 
represented as having only one culture, and all the symbolic representations produced 
within this culture were seen as always conveying the same "central, coherent, communal 
meaning". They have empowered a more political and historical view of the culture of 
each society as being composed by a set of subcultures that coexist in it. Cultural 
manifestations made by each social group have as many variations in intended and 
perceived meanings as there are social differences within the society. Thus, culture is the 
collection of multiple ways of dealing vwth the world of the smaller groups that compose it: 
a collection of "subcultures". Now, these composing "subcultures" are perceived as
involving different ways of seeing, representing, feeling and acting in a world that is always 
in the making. Each "subculture" lives in a perpetual struggle to reproduce itself against 
the others and to impose itself upon the others. The social and cultural predominance of 
one of these "subcultures" within the culture of the whole group always reflects the 
temporary imbalances of economic asymmetries and political power within the group. 
Therefore, culture is a political phenomenon and the subculture that prevails in each 
moment is' hegemonic. It is the particular and contextual arrangement of prevailing social 
and cultural forces within society that allows one of its composing fractions to define and to 
impose (by its cultural force and its reliance as representation of truth as well as by the 
concrete political and economic power of the group that holds it) its particular way of 
seeing the world as truth to the entire society.
Michel De Certeau’s concept of strategy is similar to the other two that I have
considered. The concept of strategy is understood in its relationship with the concept of
tactics. In The Practice o f Everyday Life, Certeau developed a theoretical system to
understand the ways in which people involve and interpose “themselves into the
technocratic systems of power which hold sway in the present, and to answer the
monolithic structures of power that ground Michel Foucault’s theories of disciplinary
technologies.” As Scott Bukatman explains, Certeau recovers “a more heterogeneous
practice than is inscribed in Foucault” {Terminal Identity 211-212). In his system, tactics
are opposed to strategies. Certeau states:
I call a strategy the calculation or manipulation of power relationships that becomes 
possible, as soon as a subject with will and power (a business, an army, a city, a 
scientific institution) can be isolated. It postulates a place that can be delimited as its 
own and serve as the base from which relations with an exteriority composed of 
targets or threats can be managed (The Practice o f Everyday Life 35-36).
Therefore, strategies are associated with space and operate in space. The space in
which they operate are “owned and operated by powerful dominant forces” and its
operation consolidates the power of these dominant forces “over others who impinge on
that space.” Tactics must be seen against such strategies and, for Certeau, they refer to:
The set of practices performed by subjects upon and within these controlled fields. A 
tactics is equivalent to a speech act.” [...] It is temporal, a trajectory across the spaces 
of strategic control which uses that space as its foundation. [...] The result is not the 
overthrow of a system recognized as massive and monolithic, but instead a nibbling at 
the edges of power and thus an elision of control (The Practice o f Everyday Life 33).
Thus, strategy is quite similar to the exercise of hegemony, tactics to that of challenging
subcultures.
Adhering to these views of culture, strategy, and hegemony, I propose that the 
dominant and master-narratives are deeply related to culture and politics. Narratives 
provide representations, explanations, perspectives and/or models of reality that render both 
reality meaningful and action upon reality possible and prescient; the dominant connects 
and renders meaningful the component parts of each narrative, providing its structure; the 
master-narrative defines a common structure or reference to all the narratives produced 
within a social and cultural context, connecting them one to another and each one of them 
to both the whole set of socially produced narratives and the cultural structure in which 
they appear and operate as a whole. The master narrative is a plot that acts as the dominant 
that connects all the narratives as part of a whole and, in doing so, empowers an 
authoritative or hegemonic representation of the world described. In this view, culture is a 
matter of politics; narratives are political instruments; master-narratives define reality for 
the social group that shares it. Narratives can conform and contribute to the endurance of 
master-narrative, hegemony and strategy, but they can also challenge them and be part of
tactics of denial and defiance of them. As Bukatman argues in regard to Certeau’s view of
the fimction of narratives:
A theory of narration is indissociable fi:om a theory of practices, as its condition as 
well as its production.’ Far fi-om existing apart fi-om the tactical struggle, narrative 
is fiilly embroiled in the articulation of resistance. [...] Narratives produce 
heterogeneity and resistance. [...] Narrative produces a movement -  the kinesis of 
tactical resistance. [...]
For Certeau the fimction of narrative is to demarcate boundaries: precisely to locate 
a space which may not be geographic. ‘What the map cuts up, the story cuts 
across.’ Frontiers and bridges also function as part of the narrative, serving as the 
sites of exteriority and the space in-between: in other words, they represent the other 
spaces against which the space of the story emerges. The passage into the fi-ontier 
lands, or other spaces, and the subsequent return to one’s proper space, comprise an 
archetypal narrative structure for Certeau which fi-equently reveals the ambiguity of 
the proper space itself {Terminal Identity 212-213).
Li this dissertation, this theoretical construction of the concepts of culture, master- 
narratives, hegemony, strategy and tactics is crucial because, as Bukatman concludes, fi:om 
his analysis of Certeau’s theoretical framework and from his review of half a centuiy of 
science fiction narratives, “cyberpunk fiction can be imderstood as a narrative of tactics: 
corporations and the military control cyberspace, so that the cowboys become infiltrators, 
deceivers, and tricksters. Cyberpunk narratives construct trickster tactics wdthin the 
machineries of cybernetic culture” (Terminal Identity 212).
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For my conception of the science fiction genre, I also draw on Scott Bukatman. In 
his view, the fimction of science fiction as a narrative genre can be conceived of as 
dramatizing the superimposition of technology on the human. Making use of the 
spectacular excesses and special effects, insisting upon the future as its structuring 
principle, forcing its readers to an experience of continual defamiliarization in regard to the 
world it presents, but which is still their world, making ancient but man-made dualities 
(such as day and night, up and down, masculine and feminine) disappear, attempting to
redefine the imperceptible realms of the electronic era (the virtual and disembodied 
electronic spaces of data and bits of information) in terms of the physically and 
perceptually familiar, and metaphorically rendering possible our presence and intervention 
in these disembodied spaces, science fiction has produced a space of accommodation to an 
intensely technological existence. In this space, the shock of the new is aestheticized and 
examined, the strategies of power are reinforced and challenged by narratives that include 
both utopian and dystopian views of technology, science and progress, and their impact 
upon the human and society.
Thus, Bukatman proposes that science fiction as a genre has made an effort to 
represent phenomenally, and in a way susceptible to human perception, the nonspace 
created by cyber-technology in terms of “a narrative compensation for the loss of visibility 
in an electronically defined world”, allowing it to be experienced by humans and providing 
the referential dimension that is absent fi-om these new, disembodied, electronic spaces. It 
has also proposed new images of the city or the complex industrial human environment, 
which was first projected as claxistrophobic and isolated, and now, echoing the 
transformation of the urban space that occurred in post-modern cities, has been imagined by 
its boimdlessness and directionless -  simultaneously a micro -  and a macro-cosmos. 
Furthermore, science fiction has addressed the emergence and hegemony of the spectacle as 
a way of ordering society and has been ambivalent in regard to it. Science fiction of the 
1950s, for example, has resisted the advent of the spectacular society. In the last twenty 
years, however.
The science fiction of the spectacle has moved fi-om the resentment regarding the 
infantilizing f\mction of the media to a deeper recognition of the powerfully 
controlling force of the spectacle; from the depiction of the passive consumer of 
images to the image-controlling hero; fi-om a rationalist rejection of the ‘false 
consciousness’ engendered by the spectacle to the ambivalent postmodern strategies
(barely introduced as yet) involving simultaneous acceptance and resistance through 
the proliferation of a spectacular noncoherence. In the end, image addiction is no 
longer posited as a disease; it has instead become the very condition of existence in 
post-modem culture {Terminal Identity 69).
Bukatman considers that it is only in science fiction that we meet heroes who 
distinguish themselves by their Voluntarism -  that is, their ability to control image 
addiction, to master technology, to remain human (redefined human but still human) beings 
although living in a cyberspace, a virtual realm, a machine-oriented and machine-made 
world. Thus, he proposes that science fiction must be understood in its importance to the 
present cultural moment, as a narrative genre that has kept a more ambivalent perspective 
in regard to the structures of power that permeate and shape the spectacular society in 
which we live, as well as in regard to the master-narrative of late capitalism.
Bukatman concludes that science fiction narratives have challenged as well as 
reinforced the Western technological creed and its central myth of the human ability to 
control and overcome the machines man creates; they have challenged and reinforced the 
arguments used to describe, criticize and fear the emergence of the society of the spectacle. 
Above all, they have remained ambivalent in regard to technology and the society of the 
spectacle it has engendered. Remaining ambivalent in regard to these issues, the science 
fiction geiu'e remained tactical (insofar as we may think that Certeau’s strategy is unilateral 
and one-directional) and has created a new myth: the myth of the cyborg. This myth can be 
characterized as a form of new utopianism: it is a utopia that stresses the belief in being 
human, a utopia that afiBrms the possibility of remaining human in spite of the supreme 
danger imposed to humanity by technological dependence. It is this utopia that we meet 
time and again in science fiction narratives. It is this utopia that we encounter in both Mary 
Shelley’s Frankenstein and the Wachowski Brothers’ Matrix.
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In this dissertation I am addressing and questioning the conclusion Bukatman draws 
from his analysis of Certeau’s concepts of strategy and tactics as related to the science 
fiction genre. I am proposing that the science fiction genre and/or cyber-literature as an act 
of narration do not necessarily challenge the master-narrative, the hegemony or the strategy 
of our cybernetic culture and the post-modern world. On the contrary, they seem to be 
ambiguous. Indeed, they seem to endorse both utopian and dystopian views of our 
cybernetic society. The possibility of remaining human and remaining in control of 
technology that science fiction narratives dramatize time and again is also the ideology that 
ultimately reinforces the Western technological creed.
I am also proposing that acts of narration are marred by a perverse effect. When we 
narrate facts and events, at least when we narrate them as fictitious, we risk to tame the 
social criticism with which we intend to impregnate our discourse, we risk to reinforce the 
belief on the values and views that we are trying to defy. I am proposing that strategy, 
hegemony, culture or society reserve the symbolical but bounded realm of narratives to 
expressions of discontent and criticism that are not harmful to them and to their 
reproduction. Narration ultimately tames social criticism.^
m
Having as it main objective understanding cyber-literature in its relationship to the 
master-narrative represented by the “Western technological creed” or cultural hegemony, as 
acts of narration and reading, as tactics or pieces of the prevailing strategy, this dissertation 
centers on the interpretation of two Western narratives chronologically distant. These 
narratives are, respectively: Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein and the Wachowisk brothers’ 
film, Matrix. They are considered as paradigmatic -  or, at least, representative -  of the 
ways in which the issue of the relationship between technology, science, culture and human
beings, as well as the Westem technological creed, have been treated from the time of the 
Industrial Revolution to the Information Age.
The choice of these narratives is not accidental. It follows from both practical and 
theoretical reasons. In choosing them, I was aware that, in the scope of this dissertation, I 
could not aim at an encompassing analysis of the science fiction genre as a whole. I had to 
focus on a small number of case studies. This practical reason reduced the universe of 
research. As for theoretical reasons, it has been argued that Frankenstein is one of the first 
and foremost narratives of the science fiction genre, and Frankenstein’s creature is the first 
prosthetics cyborg conceived.^ Conversely, The Matrix is one of the latest narratives of the 
genre to reach worldwide audiences. They are at the opposite poles of science fiction’s 
time frame. The first tells how the genre and/or the literary concem with technology and 
science begun; the second describes the current state of the art. In my comparison of 
Frankenstein with The Matrix, I am searching for both similarities and contrasts between 
their different ways of conceiving of the impact of technology upon who we -  human 
beings -  are, how we deal with other human beings, culture, technology and reality. 
Similarities would provide fme clues to the existence of a master narrative undemeath, 
guiding cyber-literature (the Westem technological creed); contrasts will reveal how the 
genre has changed and how these changes reveal new patterns of relationship between 
technology, culture and humankind.
IV
This work combines procedures from two prevailing approaches in literary 
criticism: cultural criticism and reader-response criticism. Cultural criticism serves to 
vmveil the social and cultural meanings of cyber-literary works. Reader-response criticism.
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more restrictedly, serves to identify how people who are actually experiencing the 
electronic technologies of the Information Age respond to them and to cyber-literature.
These ways of reading differ significantly insofar as while cultural criticism centers 
on the interpretation of texts in reference to the cultural context in which they were written, 
reader-response criticism coimects the meaning of the text to the reader's response to it. In 
the first approach, the text reveals the moment in which it was written, the prevailing 
values, beliefs and systems of knowledge; in the latter, it reveals the moment in which it is 
being read, the prevailing values, belief and systems of knowledge of the particular readers 
involved. As I am dealing with pieces of a cyber-literature that are in the making, both 
approaches can become complementary in an attempt to unveil the broad cultural meaning 
of cyber-culture, by confronting what was apparently intended by cyber-writers (or what 
we can call the strategic meaning intended by the producer of the message) and what is 
apparently perceived by cyber-readers (or what we can call the tactical interpretations of 
the receivers of the message).
The purposes, concerns and methodologies of cultural criticism are guided by the 
currently prevailing or post-modern concept of culture as a collection of subcultures, which 
remain politically laced together in a struggle for domination, authority and hegemony."* 
Thus, cultural criticism avoids rating cultural events and products. It aims "to oppose 
Cultural with capital C" and to expose the politics behind the evaluation of aesthetic 
products. It endorses a descriptive and comparative approach rather than the evaluative 
approach of cultural manifestations. It does so by: [1] considering woorthy of analysis the 
manifestations of what is called popular culture (i.e., aesthetically less valued products) as 
well to the classics; [2] reading each cultural manifestation (be it popular or erudite) in 
reference to the broad social, economic, and political context of its production, within
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which it makes sense; [3] comparing popular and erudite manifestations of each historical 
period, understanding the classics "in light of some more common forms of reading 
material, as the reflection of some common cultural myths or concerns, or as an example of 
how texts move back and forth across the alleged boundary between low and high culture"; 
[4] emphasizing the complex relationships between literary texts, ideology, the 
reproduction of society, discourses, practices, culture and power; and, [5] paying attention 
to the multiplicity of voices or discourses.
Reader-response criticism, which emerged during the 1970s, focuses on what a text 
does to the mind of the reader, rather than on the exclusive properties of the text in itself.^ 
It sees texts as being foil of gaps and argues that these gaps or blanks powerfiilly affect the 
readers, who are forced to explain them, to connect what they separate, and, literally, to 
create in their minds a text that is not in the text, but the resuh of what the text suggests by 
means of its gaps. It departs from the principle that any text requires a reader actively 
involved with it, because literature only exists when it is read. Reader-response criticism is 
thus interested in the variety of readers’ responses to the text. Central to it is, therefore, the 
idea of meaning as an event, not as something embedded in the utterance or verbal object as 
a thing in itself. A text exists and signifiées while it isbeing read, and what it signifies or 
means will depend, to no small extent, on when it is read. These meanings can reinforce 
the opinions that readers already hold or prod and provoke other opinions, challenging the 
readers to discover new truths.
Nevertheless, despite this conception of literature as something that only exists 
meaningfolly in the mind of the reader and this concurrent redefinition of the reader as an 
active producer of meaning rather than as the passive recipient of the ideas that an author 
has planted in a text, reader-response criticism raises theoretical questions about whether
12
our responses to a work are the same as its meanings, whether a work can have as many 
meanings as we have responses to it, and whether some responses are more valid than, or 
superior to, others. It also faces two major questions: one asks if any text has as many 
appropriate interpretations as it has readers; the other, considering the subjective character 
of the process of rendering the text meaningful, points to the paradox of the stability of 
interpretation (why so many readers interpret the same text in the same way?). In response 
to both questions, reader-response criticism proposes the concept of interpretive 
communities -  i.e., groups of readers who have in common interpretive strategies, which 
exist prior to the act of reading, and, therefore, determine the shape of what is read. 
Reader-response criticism is thus based on a methodology of provoking, collecting and 
analyzing readers' responses to a text as a condition to identify the meaning they produce 
and the uses they will have for it. In this process of response, provocation and register, the 
reader-response critic considers the features of the social scenario in which the reading of 
the text is made as a context that affect the readers' responses.
V
My main purpose is to discuss the impact of technological dependence on culture, 
narratives and human beings. I focus on two paradigmatic narratives -  Frankenstein and 
Matrix -  which keep in common a concem with this issue and the creation of cyborgs. The 
cyborgs created by Westem literary writers, filnmiakers, and computer games designers 
(i.e., cyber-writers) dramatize, embody and synthesize the values, habits, anxieties, fears, 
and hopes related to technology and science in our cybernetic world. I intend to reveal the 
cultural meaning of cyborgs and of the cyberspace in which they inhabit: What do they say 
about our way of perceiving the world and our peers and our way of dealing with them? 
What do they say about our way of thinking and our ability to know and to act? What do
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they say about our beliefs on progress, technology, science and the human ability to master 
man’s creations? What do they say about our habits, about our values and behavior, about 
our ability to deal with difference, otherness and change?
Therefore, I focus on two historical moments in the development of technologies 
experienced in Western societies and in the cyber-literature that characterizes them. The 
first moment roughly coincides with the Industrial Revolution; the second comprises the 
Information Age. Thus I deal with two paradigmatic cyborgs -  tiie Monster in 
Frankenstein and Neo in Matrix, which each cyber-literary-moment has imagined as an 
embodiment of the technology then available. One represents early science fiction; the 
later is representative of current cyber-literature.
In the first chapter, I consider the technological culture of contemporary Western 
Society and the most characteristic narratives it has produced; the science fiction genre and 
cyber-literature. What has actually occurred in contemporary Western society in matters of 
technology, cultural and human dependence upon technology? How are these historical 
events represented in contemporary Westem narratives such as philosophy, social sciences, 
cultural studies, and, particularly, science fiction? My purpose in writing this chapter is to 
review the theoretical literature that will provide support for the following interpretation of 
Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein and the Wachowski Brothers’ The Matrix in terms of the 
relationship between technology, culture and definition of the human in our post-modern, 
cybernetic and spectacular society. In the last chapter, I will summarize my findings and 
conclusions.
14
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NOTES
' Thus, Gramsci relates hegemony and the consent in which it is based with the 
intellectual and moral leadership of the dominant class and sees this leadership being 
produced and reproduced through a network or institutions, social relations, and ideas 
which are outside the directly political sphere (Hegemony).
 ^ I am drawing this hypothesis from the reader-response analysis of cyber-literature 
I have developed with undergraduate students at the Universidade para o Desenvolvimento 
do Alto Vale do Itajai (UNIDAVI).
 ^ Thus, according to Ana Claudia Giassone, Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein presents 
neither the characteristics of the Eighteenth Century gothic genre, nor the characteristics of 
the Nineteenth Century fantastic literature. Being basicaly a “look towards the fiiture” that 
questions its age’s optimism in regard to progress, Frankenstein is one of the first examples 
and a precursor of the literary genre known as science fiction (O Mosaico de Frankenstein 
35-36). On the conception of “prosthetics cyborg” and the view of the Creature as the first 
being of this breed, see below. Chapter 3.
 ^My discussion of cultural criticism is based on Johanna M. Smith’s essay What is 
cultural criticism?
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 ^My discussion of reader-response criticism is based on Johanna M. Smith’s essay 
What is reader-response criticism?
Chapter I
TECHNOLOGY, CULTURE AND MANKIND
Two historical moments -  spread in a time span of more than two centuries -  mark the 
limits of my study. Each one of them is contemporary to each one of the narratives I am 
analyzing. They are: the Eighteenth Centwy Age of Revolutions and the late Twentieth 
Century Information Age. From the Age of Revolutions to the Information Age, from 
modernity to post-modemity, from the society of market commodities to the society of the 
spectacle and simulacra, technology has gained space and importance both in the Western 
World and globally. Economy and politics, production and consumption, work and leisure, 
information and knowledge, health improvements and housing, food producing and wars, life 
and death, the way we see, represent, think and act in the world in which we live, the way we 
conceive our world and its time and spatial structures, our bodies and identities. We have 
become increasingly dependent upon technology.
I
The Age of Revolutions shook Western society in the late Eighteenth Century. It 
comprised and added together the effects of three revolutions: The JBrst revolution was 
eminently economic; the second was eminently cognitive and cultural; the last was eminently 
political. They were the Industrial Revolution, Enlightenment and the Democratic 
Revolutions.’
The Industrial Revolution radically transformed the economic mode of production. It 
started in Europe, expanded in a fast pace, and established the domain of a few Westem 
countries over the whole globe. Old civilizations and empires declined when confronted with
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the power of Westem businessmen, steam machines, steam ships, goods manufactured at 
reduced price, and guns. The Industrial Revolution replaced handcraft by manufactured, and, 
later, manufactured by factory products. It also transferred the center of the economic life 
from the country to the city, from rural production to industrial production, from the primary 
to the secondary economic sector. To fiilly grasp its impact, it is necessary to emphasize the 
rural (in contrast to urban) and agrarian (in contrast to industrial) character of the world before 
1789. Hobsbawm argues that, before 1789, four out of five Europeans lived in the country. 
In Britain, the urban population only surpassed the rural one as late as 1851 In this rural and 
agrarian context, the Industrial Revolution caused land concentration, broke traditional forms 
of social organization, and provoked a huge emigration from the country and to the cities.
The Industrial Revolution caused three major social transformations. First, it caiised a 
complete reordering of the productive relationships between those few who owned the means 
of production and those many who, in the daily conquest of their survival, only owned their 
bodies, their strength and their capability to work. Productive relationships became purely 
economic and were deprived of all the social values and principles they had been embedded 
with. Work became another commodity in the market, felt under market rules of supply and 
demand, and workers became easily replaceable. Second, the Industrial Revolution brought 
the industrial bourgeoisie definitely to a hegemonic position within society. As such, it 
became the source of pattems of behavior, values, ideals, principles of judgment and 
worldview to be followed by the whole society. Third and most important to my concerns 
here, it increased in an unimaginable way mankind’s dependence upon technology. Industrial 
technologies made products cheaper; new technologies of transportation rendered them more 
available; the new social division of labor and tremendous specialization rendered them 
needed.
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The second revolution of the age was taking place at the level of mentalities. It is 
related with the philosophical, scientific and literary movement that came to be known as 
Enlighteimient. Roughly, it consisted on the conviction on the progress of human civilization, 
knowledge, science, reason, wealth and control over nature. As Ana Cláudia Giassone points 
out, “the idea that mankind inexorably makes progress and moves towards the fulfillment of a 
better and prosper future belongs to the Enlightenment’s tradition and was recurrent 
throughout the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries” (O Mosaico de Frankenstein 34). Its 
champions came from the classes most representative of economic progress and more directly 
involved in the technological and economic advances made at the period: men from the 
financial and commercial circles, manufacturers, entrepreneurs as Benjamin Franklin, and 
inventors of technological devices as James Watt. They questioned political and religious 
authorities and promoted the disenchantment of the world, denying a supematural worldview, 
abandoning superstitions, condemning non-rationally based beliefs and, particularly, rejecting 
the doctrine on God’s original revelation of truth to His followers. The scientific method of 
research substituted the theological view of reality; human reason substituted dogma and 
divine revelation; a view of society as a product of human activity substituted its view as a 
divine gift or grace. Furthermore, they fought against traditional hierarchies of social status 
that defined men’s places within society according to their birth and blood, proved their 
irrationality, and replaced them with an ideal of social ascension and status according to their 
individual merits and abilities, which was based on the notion of the individual, his will and 
freedom, as thé central organizing principle of the new modem society.
The man of the Enlighteimient was also a new human individual. He was a being 
freed from original sins and curse, freed from God’s ancestry, condemnation or blessing. As 
Lee Heller points out in her Frankenstein and the Cultural Uses o f Gothic, the man of the 
Enlightenment was conceived of as a tabula rasa at his birth. He was a being whose
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character, behavior and nature would be influenced by education, habits and mechanisms of 
social control. As Ana Cláudia Giassone suggested, the man of the Enlightenment was also 
conceived in terms of another major myth: the Rousseaunian myth of the “noble salvage.” 
Thus, it was a man conceived of as being naturally good, but open to evil influences from 
society.
Finally, the third revolution that shaped the Age of Revolutions, at the aftermath of 
which Mary Shelley wrote Frankenstein, was political. It is related to the American 
Independence (1787) and the French Revolution (1789) and the whole set of democratic 
revolutions and nationalistic movements that shook E^ope and the Americas throughout the 
late Eighteenth and early Nineteenth Centuries. These Democratic Revolutions were 
triggered by the emergence of liberal ideals and represented the entrance of the popular 
element in politics. It also raised fears and reactions among the middle and upper classes.
The consequences of the Age of Revolutions were immediately felt and addressed by 
the intellectual elites of Europe. As Hobsbawm points out, in the short run, lacking in urban 
infrastructure, sewage and job opportunities, cities swelled and became the scenario of 
increasing social problems. While the factories watched the shameful spectacle of abusive 
journeys, children and women working for a lower pay than the insidious wages of men, the 
shantytowns of industrial cities got ridden by prostitution, high indexes of suicide, 
alcoholism, crime, rampant violence, and epidemics. As Warren Montag points out, it was “a 
time when the oppressive and dehumanizing effects of capitalism were all too obvious” (The 
Workshop o f the Filthy Creation 311). Thus, an era of social demands by the working classes 
and social turmoil was open; socialist and anarchist utopias surfaced, class confrontations 
blossomed.
The intellectual elites of the middle and upper classes -  who produced the narratives I 
will be discussing -  reacted with concern and anguish. As Johanna Smith points out, they
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were driven by opposite impulses and nvjrtured ambivalent feelings in regard to the lower 
classes {Biographical and Historical Contexts 16-17). They endorsed human rights, 
abominated class oppression, believed in the progress of mankind, related science, technology 
and material prosperity with social justice, and abode to the Westem technological creed. 
Nevertheless, they observed that social wealth and material progress, science and technology 
were not enough to guarantee the improvement of living conditions for all, or to reduce social 
unrest, and felt nostalgia for the stability, order and peace of mind they experienced under the 
older regime. They felt pity for the miserable conditions of life people endured in urban, 
industrial shantytowns, but they feared the mobs and the mobilization of the working classes. 
They were both revolutionary and conservative and they produced both narratives that reveal 
their faith in technology, science and progress and narratives that reveal their concems with 
regard to the impact of technology, science and progress upon the human condition.
In the long run, the Age of Revolutions meant the hegemony, in a global scale, of the 
capitalist mode of production. It opened an era of irreversible industrialization, urbanization 
and rationalism. Pattems of production and consumption changed radically; standards of 
living and social organization changed accordingly. New commodities became available in 
massive scale, fueling dreams and desires; technological improvements, reducing the costs of 
their production, made them affordable. Thus, Emest Mandel concludes that modem and 
post-modem Westem societies went through three economic revolutions, which have been 
govemed by revolutions in technology {Late Capitalism). First, there was the steam engine of 
1848, which introduced the mechanical age, shook society, and opened a new mode of 
production. Then, there was the rise of electricitj' and the combustion engine in the late 
nineteenth century. Since the 1940s, there has been the development of nuclear and electronic 
technologies, which reached its peak by the end of the twentieth century and brought up the 
Information Age and the “society of the spectacle” in which we live.^
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From one stage to the following, human dependence upon technology has grown and 
technology itself has become a highly demanded commodity. The mdimentary steam 
machines that prompted the Industrial Revolution have given place to the electrically powered 
machinery; mechanical technologies opened space to electrical, electronic, digital and 
nanotechnologies. In the mechanical age, technology was restricted to working places, a 
public domain from which the domestic world was radically separated. In the electrical age, 
the machines went from factories to streets and invaded our houses; they reshaped daily habits 
from the accomplishment of everyday household tasks to leisure time; they also transformed 
the way our ancestors perceived the world. Finally, in the computer age, technology has 
emulated o\ir brain; it has invisibly invaded our beings, reshaping the ways we think and 
write, creating a new space in which we can live free from our bodily limitations 
(cyberspace), and redefining our sense of humanity. Initially, technology essentially meant 
instruments of wealth and power. Later it added the meanings of affluence and comfort. 
Nowadays, technology equals information and knowledge. Technology has never rested and 
its impact on society, culture and narratives has steadily risen.
n
As Westemers’ dependence upon technology has increased, westem narratives on the 
issue of the relationship between mankind and technology have changed accordingly. Now, 
being produced within a society ridden by electronics, nanotechnologies, digital technologies, 
genetic engineering, mass media and world wide webs of information, our narratives imagine 
and depict a world full of cyborgs -  hybrid beings, half biological organism and half 
machine- which deeply change the way we are used to conceive the humane.'* When doing 
so, our narratives continue to be ridden by opposite views of the relationship between 
technology and humankind, artifacts and nature. They continue to see technology and 
artifacts as both threatening and liberating for humanity.
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Martin Irvine has recently called attention to the contradictory myths involving 
technology in Westem societies. He has not only pointed out the existence of three 
definitions of technology in the current social discourse -  the definition of technology as 
instrumentality, its definition as industrialization and its definition as novelty -  but he has 
also, and principally, identified the existence of two major and opposite cultural traditions: a 
utopian tradition that relates technology to sublime power and beneficial influence and a 
dystopian tradition, which relates it to a fall from grace, innocence and nature. Furthermore, 
Irvine has shown that utopian and dystopian views of technology were bom together 
(Technology, Ideology, and Social History). How do these so opposite views of technology 
and its relationships with human nature, culture and society continue to be carried in our 
modem and post-modem ages?
*
Technology has revolutionized our imaginary even more profound than as it 
revolutionized our economy. Technology has fi-om the onset of the Industrial Revolution 
generated a kind of “sublime euphoria” in respect to progress and the future. Our actual 
dependence on technology has empowered a utopian view of technology and science and has 
put to work -  as a master-narrative that has prevailed in Westem society for the most part of 
the last two centuries -  a fimdamental belief in progress and in man’s ability to master their 
own creations. Throughout modernity, this belief became the socially hegemonic narrative in 
which we believed. It is still hegemonic in our post-modem age. It has guided our 
perceptions and explanations of reality, it has modeled our practices, and we have 
unconsciously accepted and followed it, as we have rarely been able to defy it consciously. 
Indeed, this hegemonic narrative has remained able to accommodate our few challenges. 
Technological dependence and technological creed continue to shape the way we think of
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society, culture and humanity, as they are reproduced in everyday talks, literature, films, 
cultural theory, philosophy and the social sciences.
Throughout the last two centuries, Westem society watched the emergence and 
consolidation of scientific explanations of society and culture as heavily dependent upon 
technology. David Bell proposes that technology fulfills a major role within human society. 
While culture guards continuity in hviman afifairs, technology governs change and “always 
creates a crisis for culture.”  ^ In his recent analysis of the cyberspace created by the electronic 
technology of the Information Age, Mark Slouka proposes that technologies are central in 
human and social development, and they are never neutral forces fi-om a human, social and 
cultural standpoint. On the contrary, they order behavior and establish rules by which people 
live; they redefine people’s values and reconstitute lives in unpredictable ways; they alter our 
sense of reality and have social and cultural implications, because they entail unpredictable 
risks and pose broadly ethical questions. Slouka argues that these ideas are mostly valid in 
regard to cyber-technology, which he perceives as having both positive and negative 
implications, utopian and dystopian overtones (War o f the Worlds).
A theoretical paradigm that relates both mankind’s evolution to tools and socio­
cultural formations, as well as men’s self-imagination with regard to the technology available 
in each historical moment also emerged in early anthropological theories. They used to 
distinguish humans from other animal as tool users and to stress that, during hominid 
evolution, the reliance on tools increased. Tools have become more numerous, more 
diversified, functionally differentiated, and have been designed for more specialized tasks.® 
This theoretical paradigm underlies the conception of culture as the defining characteristic of 
mankind. In this context, Serge Moscovici has argued that culture is both the result of a 
process of rendering nature artificial and the cause of the emergence mid supremacy of the 
human gender above the other species. He has also argued that throughout its evolution, the
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human species has never been exclusively dependent upon its organism and instincts; on the 
contrary, it has always relied on the artificial order of culture and society, which have to be 
defined as a counter-nature. Reinforcing this view, Ezio Manzine has also proposed that 
every human action relates to cultural facts that have artificiality as their essence. Their 
arguments are a major source for the analysis of the process of “cyborgization” that marks our 
contemporaiy culture, which is, therefore, seen as the inevitable continuation of this process 
of artificialization of life that characterizes human evolution.^ Furthermore, Westem culture 
has become used to constant and daily reminders of how our fast-changing technologies can
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alter our lives.
This view on the determination of society, culture and mankind by artifacts and 
technology has remained hegemonic in our modem and post-modem imaginary. 
Nevertheless, hegemony never means exclusiveness. As Bukatman argues, the initial sublime 
euphoria in regard to technology, science and progress has increasingly given place to a 
sublime terror and to a view that demonizes technology (Terminal Identity 4). The euphoria 
and the utopian view of technology have been increasingly mugged by dystopian 
representations of it. They have given way to historically increasing trends to bring progress, 
science and technology into question, to consider them as both fact and illusion, and to see 
them as the source of problems that afflict Westem society and culture; alienation, 
environmental degradation, the threat of nuclear destruction, and, crucial for my purposes in 
this thesis, the redefinition of our representation of humanity and the limits of the human.
Michael Heim has called this trend to perceive technology as terror “technoanxiety,” 
and Scott Bukatman has made technoanxiety and the questions it raises both the core of 
science fiction narratives (including cyberpunk) and the outstanding characteristic of post- 
modemity.^ Twentieth Century philosophy, social sciences, and cultural studies have been 
packed with dystopian narratives on technology and challenges to the Westem technological
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creed. When dealing with technology, historians have increasingly refuted its autonomy and 
have increasingly supported the proposition that they are “social products, susceptible to 
democratic controls”. When dealing with the Westem myth of progress, they have brought it 
under heavy fire.’° Even the notion of science as tmth has been attacked by post-modem 
criticism.'* Westem technologies have thus generated both utopian and dystopian views of its 
social and human consequences.*^ This ambivalence occurs because, as Bukatman states, 
“the technologies of the Twentieth Century haye been at once the most liberating and the most 
repressive in history, evoking sublime terror and sublime euphoria in equal measures” 
(Terminal Identity).
m
Social and cultural studies on the Information Age are intensely ridden by both 
utopian and dystopian views of technology and the process of cyborgization of humanity. I 
will consider here the arguments that shape these opposite views as they are proposed by 
Michael Heim and André Lemos. On the one hand, the work of Michael Heim represents a 
number of scholars who have argued that Westem dependence upon technology is a fairly 
recent experiment in the history of mankind, and have stressed that our overwhelming 
dependence renders our civilization quite specific and dangerously de-humanizing. On the 
other, the recent works of André Lemos speaks for a number of scholars who have defined 
our civilization as the realm of cyborgs, but have proposed an interpretation of the 
relationship between mankind and technology as a long-lasting process in which the 
civilization of the cyborgs represents a new stage on human evolution rather than a radical 
revolution.*^
27
In Heim’s view, technology imposes a threat more sinister than the revolt of machines
against mankind that was conceived of under the “computer as opponent” paradigm. It
“infiltrates human existence more intimately than anything humans could create:”
The danger of technology lies in the transformation of the human being, by which 
human actions and aspirations are fundamentally distorted. Not that machines can run 
amok, or even that we might misunderstand ourselves through a faulty comparison 
with machines. Instead, technology enters tiie inmost recesses of human existence, 
transforming the way we know and think and will. Technology is, in essence, a mode 
of human existence, and we could not appreciate its mental infiltration until the 
computer became a major cultural phenomenon (The Metaphysics o f Virtual Reality 
61).
Technology has definitely changed the way we conceive both reality and ourselves:
Now we are wedded to machines. ...] So closely do we work with devices that we 
seldom notice them -  until they breakdown. Machines are no longer merely machines 
but have become electromechanical appliances. Applied technology fills our lives 
with familiar routines. ...] Devices attach to every aspect of life, creating a 
technological culture. Our marriage to technology embraces production, 
transportation and communication. ...] Our selves plus the machines constitute a 
feedback loop {The Metaphysics o f Virtual Reality 74-75).
As Scott Bukatman states, fi'om the social point of view, technology has changed more 
than the spectacular representations of society. It has transformed social actions in spectacles 
themselves. From the human standpoint, technology is now “pervasive, utterly intimate. Not 
outside us, birt next to us. Under our skin; often inside our minds.” D
On the other hand, in the new utopian view supported by Lemos’s interpretation, to 
become cyborgs appears as the achievement of the evolutionary fate inscribed in mankind 
since its emergence and its rise to supremacy among the animal species rather than a de­
humanizing turn of events.*^ The triumph of this natural destiny obliges iis to reach for a new 
conception of the relationship between mankind and technology and brings with it the
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potential to free ourselves from the traditions of oppression, social exploitation and cultural 
prejudices. In this alternative view, technology involves a process of synergy and we have to 
consider that the following three phenomena have been so universal and ordinary for mankind 
that they have to be considered as natural or deeply human. They are: the dependence on 
technology and artifacts or the building of an artificial order imposed to the natural world; the 
virtualization of reality; and the imagination of cyborgs.
Initially, referring to the works of Bernard Stiegler and André Leroi-Gourhan, Lemos 
shows that the production of the artificial is an activity totally natural for mankind. Indeed, 
the production of the artificial and/or the development of technologies have provided 
solutions for the zoological evolution of the human specie. The technical phenomenon is the 
first manifestation of the human dimension; the production of the first technical aitifacts is 
intunately related to the development of the cortex and the invention of language; and, 
mankind cannot be defined or understood without the technical and/or artificial dimension. 
Thus, Lemos emphasizes that the essence of the human nature is shaped in a process that can 
be perceived as of human de-naturalization set in motion by the emergence of pre-historical 
techniques.*®
André Lemos also argues that the process of virtualization of reality does not mean the 
end of reality, nor is it historically recent as the conception of a post-modern civilization of 
the virtual may suggest. This process of virtualization creates the virtual and, from this 
perspective, the virtual does not mean a false, illusory or imaginary dimension. The virtual 
opposes the current rather than the real. It represents another kind of reality -  the reality of 
what is possible to exist, the reality of what exists as a potentiality. In consequence, the 
virtual always contains a questioning of the current, it always means a form of freeing himian 
beings from the physical and symbolic limits imposed by the situation in which they currently 
live (the here and now), and it always refers to the human ability to imagine other possible
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realities rather than falsehood. Virtualization is a process inherent in human language and 
technology. In consequence, it is inherent in every artistic expression, every artifact, every 
tool and every machine mankind makes. From this perspective, every form of art is an- 
operator of virtualizations -  provisions of ways out of the limited situations of a physical 
and/or symbolic here and now and attempts to question the real and to broaden the limits of 
the possible. What distinguishes the electronic arts of our post-modem world from their 
predecessors is only an unprecedented radicalization of this process of virtualization through 
the digital technologies that no longer attempt to represent the world, but, instead, create 
digital, algorithmic simulacra of the world. These do not represent the world, but they work 
as models for shaping a new world. They do not try to simulate nature; instead they replace 
the world with the new realities of the virtual.’’
Finally, Lemos points out how common and old is the process of conceiving 
unnaturally bom beings by human beings, questioning also the novelty of the process of 
cyborgization in terms of the imaginary. He stresses, however, three different historical 
moments on this imagination of artificial beings. First, men imagined artificial beings that 
came to the world animated by a divine act. They represented life entering the artifacts by 
God’s will. Later, men imagined robots, which were animated by mechanical and electric 
powers and represented the simulation of life through mechanical movements. Robots 
imitated life in its movements and were endowed with (logical) intelligence; nevertheless, 
they remained different from the human being, because they were perpetually imprisoned by 
its mechanisms and lack of sentiments and emotions. The imaginary of robots kept intact the 
border between the artificial and the human. Finally, men came to imagine cyborgs -  hybrid 
beings whose organisms melts together mechanical and biological elements, who blur the 
distance and erase the difference between the human and the machine, and (insofar as they 
cross over the borders traditionally built to order the world and to think about the world) who
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hold the ability to revolutionize culture and society, liberating mankind from the prejudices 
that have imprisoned and enslaved it (A Página dos Cyborgs: (4) O Imaginário do Cyborg).
Lemos states that our technologies have breed three types of cyborgs, who constitute 
the real picture of our humanity. There is, first, the prosthetics cyborgs, who refer to the 
human use of technological (mechanical, electric and electronic) devices to extend both body 
and mind abilities. In his view, prosthetic cyborgs symbolize a symbiosis between organic 
and inorganic, the biological and the technological, and their existence emphasizes the bodily 
fijsion of meat and machinery. Prosthetic cyborgs are every person whose physiological 
fimctioning is aided by, or dependent on, a mechanical or electronic device and, in accordance 
with Lemos, there is some consensus in regard to the view of the Creature on Mary Shelley’s 
Frankenstein as being the first literary prosthetic cyborg. In contradistinction, there is, 
secondly, the interpretive cyborgs. They appeared with the technologies of mass 
communication, virtualization of reality and spectacularization of society. They do not 
emphasize the bodily fiision of meat and technological devices, but represent our submission 
to, control and transformation by the technology of spectacles as Guy Debord has conceived 
of them: the most subtle and ruthless weapon of late capitalism, able to produce continuous 
alienation and oppression. They meant a technologically controlled and enslaved subjectivity. 
Finally, Lemos argues that the new technologies of information and the world wide web, 
which are not based on a totalitarian and centralized system of provision of one message for 
all users, but allow that every user build his/her own connections with the information and/or 
message centers, have engendered the advent of a third kind of cyborgs: the netcyborgs. They 
can escape the control of the media and, thus, the domination of the spectacle by using the 
new media of communication socially available.**
Thus, for Lemos, the dichotomy between the artificial and the natural is meaningless 
in human matters and the existence of the cyborgs has to be conceived of as part of the
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development of mankind. In consequence, the civilization of the virtual and the world of the 
cyborgs -  which have become possible because of the development of information, electronic 
and digital technologies, and were ridden by processes of virtualization of reality and 
“cyborgization” of the body -  become only a natural sequence in human evolution. This view 
often involves a utopian conception of technology, which is seen as able to fieed mankind to 
reach new and more democratic individual and social experiences.’  ^ It considers that the new 
information, digital and electronic technologies make us cybor s ho O' exper ece e 
orms 0 tech d - s o c  ab ty that a o us to escape rom the soc ety o the spectac e.
IV
In conclusion: both the dystopian view of technology and the new utopian view of 
electronic, digital and information technology have in common a view that technology has 
become visceral to and synergic with contemporary mankind. Human beings became 
cyborgs. They disagree, however, in regard to both the origin of this synergy and visceral 
relationship between technology and mankind and its consequences for the fate of mankind. 
Dystopian viewers see it as a historically recent phenomenon and emphasize its danger to 
humanity. They stress that artifacts and technology have always been opposite to the human 
nature and consider that the current synergy established between information and electronic 
technologies and mankind represent a danger to mankind. The cyborg -  who embodies this 
synergy -  means a denial of the human essence. On the other hand, drawing on archeological 
findings, the new utopianism has reversed this view. Its proponents point out that the synergy 
that exists between man and artifacts, mankind and technology is a defining zoological and 
anthropological characteristic of mankind. Thus, they have stated that the extraordinary 
development of the human species is related and overwhelmingly due to human reliance on 
tools, techniques and technology, insofer as "la pro-these n'est pas un simple prolongement du 
corps humain, elle est la constitution de ce corps en tant quTiumain."^® To become a cyborg
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means to achieve man’s destiny. It is not a supreme danger to the himian essence. The two 
views also disagree in regard to the kind of society in which these cyborgs now have to live. 
This issue is the object of the next chapter.
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NOTES:
* In the following paragraphs, I am heavily drawing on Eric Hobsbawm’s Era das 
Revoluções.
 ^Obviously there were provincial towns and there were huge differences between their 
population and the properly rural one. Nevértheless these towns were completely different 
from tiie cities that emerged with industrialization and capitalism. They heavily depended on 
rural economy, belonged to rural society, and held rural values and worldview.
 ^Quoted by Scott Bukatman (Terminal Identity 3-4).
 ^According to André Lemos, A Página dos Cyborgs: (4) O Imaginário do Cyborg , 
the term “cyborg” entered the science fiction genre in Arthur Clark’s short story “The City 
and the Stars”, from 1965. It was invented in 1960 by Manfred Clynes, a scientist in 
biomedical engineering, who wrote an article entitled “Cyborgs and Space” and defined it as 
“the melding of the organic and the mechanical, or the engineering of a union between 
separate organic systems.”
 ^Thesis proposed by Bukatman, quoting Daniel Bell (Terminal Identity 3).
® In this issue, see Conrad Kottak (Cultural Anthropology, 72-87).
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’ See: Serge Moscovici, La Societé Contre Nature and Ezio Manzine, Artefacts:). 
These authors have been referred to and quoted by André Lemos, in his analysis of the central 
place of cyborgs in our contemporary culture. As I will consider below, one fundament of 
Lemos’s interpretation of the contemporary society consists on the conception of a process of 
synergy between mankind and technology {A Página dos Cybors: (1) Cyborgização da 
Cultura Contemporânea).
® Thus, Bukatman says: “Cyberpunk is about how our increasingly intimate feedback 
relationship with the technosphere we are creating has been, is, and will be, altering our 
definition of what it means to be human itself’ (Terminal Identity 234). I will return to this 
issue later in this chapter.
On the first issue, see Merritt Roe Smith and Leo Marx (Does Technology Drive 
History). And, on the second, consider Leo Marx and Bruce Mazlish (Progress: Fact or 
Illusion?).
” On this issue, consider Katherine Hayles’s course description (How to do things 
with narratives: literary methods and scientific legitimation).
This thesis has been proposed by Bukatman (Terminal Identity 4) and Martin Irvine 
(Technology, Ideology, and Social History).
See André Lemos: A Página dos Cyborgs', Tecnologia e Vida Social na Cultura 
Contemporânea-, Arte Eletrônica e Cibercultura\ and, Santa Clara Poltergeist.
Thesis proposed by Bukatman, interpreting an assertion of Bruce Mazlish (Terminal 
Identity 8) and by Michael Heim, when interpreting Heidegger’s essay on technology (The 
Metaphysics o f Virtual Reality 70).
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For an introduction on this view, see André Lemos, “A Página dos Cyborgs -  (1) 
Cyborgização da Cultura Contemporânea.'' Lemos draw most of his argument from: Bernard 
Stiegler {La Technique et le Temps)-, Serge Moscovici {La Société Contre Nature)-, and, Ezio 
Manzine {Artefacts).
André Lemos addresses this issue in A Página dos Cyborgs: (2) Civilização do 
Virtuar and Arte Eletrônica e Cibercultura.
André Lemos, A Página dos Cyborgs: (6) Cyborgs Proféticos e Interpretativos and 
A Página dos Cyborgs: (7) Netcyborgs e BodyNet.
André Lemos dedicates a large part of his comments to Donna Haraway’s Cyborg 
Manifesto, which states that the cyborgization of mankind is revolutionary insofar as it 
enables the questioning of traditionally, culturally and politically built and imposed 
dichotomies and social identities. The advent of cyborgs renders possible to escape from the 
Westem phallocentric myth, racism and sexism. It also allows the criticism of Marxism and 
Feminism that have failed as strategies of social identification. Thus the cyborg is a type of 
myth on social identities and their borders. See Lemos {Arte Eletrônica e Cibercultura and A 
Página dos Cyborgs: (5) O Discurso dos Cyborgs).
Thus, Bemard Stiegler states; “The prosthesis is not a mere extension of the human 
body; it is the shaping of this body as human” (La Technicque et le Temps 162).
CHAPTER n
FRANKENSTEIN:
A MODERN APPROACH TO MANKIND’S DEPENDENCE ON
TECHNOLOGY
Mary Shelley was bom on August 30, 1797, in London. She was the daughter of 
feminist writer Mary Wollstonecrafl and radical philosopher Willian Goldwin. Her 
mother died at her birth, but left Mary Shelley a legacy of ambivalent rather than 
contradictory thoughts on feminist and political issues referring to the working classes. 
She was concemed with the improvement of women’s position as members of society 
and citizens, but she saw it as being related to the fiilfilhnent of women’s traditional 
domestic roles. The thought of William Goldwin was not free from contradictions. He 
welcomed the French Revolution and fought for extending the French example into 
England, but always kept great reservation in regard to the entrance of the popular 
classes or lower orders in politics. Joharma Smith reminds us that Shelley was 
rereading two of the major works of her parents at the time she was writing 
Frankenstein, and states that her novel was influenced by these ambivalences between 
revolutionary and reformist impulses {Biographical and Historical Contexts 7-9). Mary 
Shelley met her husband, Percy Shelley, in 1812. Percy was married, but in 1814 they 
fled to France and Mary became his mistress. They married after the suicide of Percy’s 
wife in 1816. The same year, she started writing Frankenstein as a short ghost story.
She first published it, anonymously, in 1818. She returned to England after Percy’s 
death in 1822, reprinted Frankenstein in 1823 and devoted herself to publicize her 
husband’s writings and to educate their surviving child. The revised version of 
Frankenstein was printed in 1831 and contains several changes and a preface in which 
Shelley presents the history of the novel. Shelley wrote a travel book, History o f a Six 
Weeks’ Tour (1817) that contains information on the summer she spent near Geneva, 
when she wrote Frankenstein, and other novels, among which The Last Man (1826), an 
account of the fijture destruction of the human race by a plague, is still ranked as her 
best work. Shelley died in 1851.
*
There is a huge amount of literature on Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein. It 
embraces Marxist criticism, Psychoanalytic criticism. Feminist criticism. Cultural 
criticism and Reader-Response criticism. These readings multiply the intended 
messages and meanings of Shelley’s novel. Some of them provide clues on the 
historical context in which Frankenstein was written. Some of these readings will be 
here considered as sources that can help us grasp the meanings of Shelley’s novel. I see 
these readings as guides to my study and as narratives that belong to Frankenstein's 
master-narrative or symbolic universe.
My reading of Shelley’s novel (chapter HI) centers on a few basic questions. 
How has she dealt with the issue of the influence of technology upon culture and 
humankind? What has she to say in regard to the increasing dependence of mankind 
upon technology? Why has she chosen to give birth to the first “prosthetic cyborg” in 
literature -  Frankenstein’s Creature? I read Frankenstein as a modem approach to 
human dependence on technology and as the cause of a profound technological impact 
on the definition of the human essence. From this reading, I will proceed to consider
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how the imaginary of cyborgs has evolved in contemporary Westem society, in general, 
and in the science fiction genre, in particular; to comprehend how it has shaped oiir 
definition of the human and our imagination of the relationship between technology and 
mankind; and, then, to analyse the power of narratives as instruments of reproduction, 
challenge and transformation of social structures and cultural models.
I
The different readings of the novel can be classified into two broad categories: 
those that pay close attention to the historical context within which the novel was 
written, and those that neglect it. On the one hand, the readings produced according to 
the closer theoretical references that guide both the French Feminist criticism and the 
psychoanalytic criticism lack on historical concem and lose most of Frankenstein’s 
historical references. They center on the discussion of issues that transcend Mary 
Shelley’s life and hold universal validity: the distinction between the Imaginary and the 
Symbolic orders, the Oedipal crisis, the Father’s Law, the androcentric social order and 
its exclusion of women, the stages of development of mind and so on. On the other 
hand, readings produced according to the theoretical references provided by British 
Feminist criticism, Marxist criticism and Cultural Criticism disagree on the aspects of 
the historical, social and cultural context that they emphasize in their attempts to 
interpret Frankenstein, but they agree that historical references are crucial to fiilly grasp 
its messages, its intention and its endurance.
The readings that belong to this second category point to the historical moment 
that confers meaning to the original writing of Frankenstein. Mary Shelley was 
contemporary of the Age of Revolutions, which was a moment of transition and radical 
cultural transformation; it was an age in which a new order -  marked by 
industrialization, urbanization, rationalization, liberalism and individualism -  was
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overthrowing an older order, which was agrarian, rural, enchanted and ruled by tradition 
and heritage; it was a historical moment of social and cultural turmoil -  particularly in 
Britain -  that Mary Shelley experienced as a member of the intellectual elite.
Johanna Smith argues that Frankenstein is contaminated by the ambivalence that 
prevailed among British intellectual elites between revolutionary and conservative 
impulses “during the years 1789 (the begirming of the French Revolution) and 1832 (the 
passage of the Reform Bill [in England], which enfranchised sections of the English 
middle classes for the first time)” {Biographical and Historical Contexts 4). She insists 
that this ambivalence was present on the thoughts of Shelley’s parents and is expressed 
in Frankenstein. Johanna Smith {Cooped Up) and Mary Poovey {My Hideous Progeny) 
discuss the separate spheres doctrine, which split off the social world in two gender 
related social spaces: the public space is related to manhood and the domestic domain is 
conceived of as a feminine shelter. Thus, Smith considers that Frankenstein discusses 
the advantages and hazards of the predominance of an old pattem of indebted gratitude 
or a new pattem of affective protection in the relationships between parents and 
children. Margaret Homans, in '‘"Bearing Demons”, discusses the cultural power that the 
Romantic Quest still held as a worldview and as a guiding model for gender relations. 
Warren Montag in The Workshop o f the Filthy Creation, Lee Heller in Frankenstein and 
the Cultural Uses o f Gothic, and Ana Claudia Giassone in O Mosaico de Frankenstein 
define the cultural scenario in which Shelley wrote Frankenstein in terms of the age of 
the revolution that shook Europe with the advent of manufactures, the growth of cities 
and urban population, and the expansion of literacy and school education.
Drawing a picture of the historical context in which Shelley wrote her novel, The 
Workshop o f Filthy Creation focuses on the Age of Revolutions and stresses the events 
of the Enlighteimient, the French Revolution and the British Industrial Revolution, and
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how they gave birth to contradictory social forces and conflicting ideological beliefs. 
These events generated the hegemonic belief that industrialization had put in motion a 
process in which scientific knowledge, technological development, and the 
improvement of the condition of mankind were interwoven. Nevertheless, they also 
opened up an era of social instability and chaos geared by the ambivalent feelings that 
the new elites nurtured with regard to the industrial working class -  namely: a 
generalized fear in regard to its mobilization (which had been required to overthrow the 
Old State, but now threatened the new order) and a widespread sense of pity, because of 
the decrease of the living standards that followed the substitution of men by machinery. 
Montag also emphasizes that “the progressive artists of Shelley’s milieu” were unable to 
identify with the proletariat and to adopt its point of view; they came to portray it as a 
monster that causes fear but deserves pity. In this historical context, Montag equals 
Frankenstein's Creature to the emerging industrial working class and Frankenstein is 
here perceived as an allegory of the entrance of the popular classes in the political scene 
of the French Revolution.’
Meanwhile, Heller stresses three interconnected elements of this cultural 
scenario as being crucial for the understanding of Frankenstein. First, there was the 
emergence of new theories in regard to the formation of the human character, which 
defied the paradigms of hereditary and iimate features, empowered a view of the human 
mind as tabula rasa, and implied the possibility of controling and creating human 
personality and conduct. These were related to the philosophical works of Locke and 
Rosseau. Second and consequently, an increasing role was attributed by social and 
intellectual elites to education and reading in the shaping of people's lives, in controlling 
the social groups they conceived of as most vuhierable to the age of social instability 
and most dangerous if ill-formed -  middle-class children, women, and the working class
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-  and in redefining hviman nature as a whole. Finally, there was the emergence and 
popularization of a new kind of fiction -  the horror Gothic genre -  that developed in 
response to the extension of literacy to new classes of potential readers: women, 
schoolboys, and the labor class.
The Enlighteimient, the French Revolution and the First Industrial Revolution 
are also the historical references emphasized in O Mosaico de Frankenstein. Giassone 
understands Frankenstein as a result of Shelley’s questioning of the age in which she 
lived and defines this age as “the painfiil transition of Westem society towards 
modernity” {Q Mosaico de Frankenstein 42). In this transition, Giassones emphasizes 
the process of rationalization and disenchantment of the world which were closely 
related to the Enlightemnent and a consequence of both the consolidation of the process 
of Christianization of Westem society and the rise of science and technology, which 
have reduced the influence that the supernatural dimension -  magical practices, pagan 
rituals, beliefs in witches and devils, curses, benedictions and miracles -  have always 
exercised upon daily life. Giassone questions, however, the conclusion reached by 
historians Jean Delumeau and Keith Thomas, who propose that rationalization and 
Christianization worked together to eradicate fear. On the contrary, Giassone argues 
that fear has been transformed, but remained and has even increased in the face of the 
wonders science and technology created. Thus, she shows that medicine and anatomy 
were looked at with distrust, doctors conceived of as charlatans or thieves of corpses. In 
this context, a wave of fear related with the issue of pre-death burial shook the 
Nineteenth Century Europe (O Mosaico de Frankenstein 47-48). Giassone also
•
exemplifies the terror science and technology generated in Shelley’s time, when the 
social representation of electricity as one of the most terrifying inventions of the time 
provoked both reverence and fear (O Mosaico de Frankenstein 52-54). Rationalization
41
and desenchantment of the world, Giassone concludes, did not mean the end of fear. On 
the contrary, they raised new fears related to the transgression of divine and natural laws 
among those common people who watched with perplexity the dynamic changes society 
and the world were experiencing. They remained afflicted by both the loss of references 
provided by tradition to understand reality and by the impossibility of conciliating 
religious dogmas and new scientific paradigms. These people, nonetheless, remained 
unable to make sense of the wonders science creates without making use of the 
traditional idiom of magic and religion.
Giassone also calls attention to the industrial revolution, the growth of cities, the 
désintégration of traditional structures of social organization that prevailed in rural 
settings, and the entrance of the popular classes in politics during the French 
Revolution. Finally, she stresses the conceptions held throughout this age by British 
intellectual elites of the natural state, society and the lower classes - namely: their 
revolutionary and conservative impulses; their support to human rights and liberal 
governments coupled with their concern with the disorderly, violent and dangerous 
character of the lower classes; their belief in progress and civilization coupled with their 
idealization of the noble savage and the values it stands for; their criticism of social 
injustices coupled with an idealization of traditional values and pattems of social 
organization, now endangered by industrialization and urbanization (O Mosaico de 
Frankenstein 72-73).
These readings, of course, share the view that the historical context of the novel 
was a time of transition in matters related to the prevailing mode of economic 
production (the emergence of industrial capitalism), the dominant social class (the rise 
of the bovu-geoisie), the predominant political ideologies (liberalism), and the hegemonic
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worldview. It was also a time of new cultural values and pattems of social organization 
(rationalism, individualism and the Westem technological creed).
n
Despite the consensus as to the historical context, readings of Frankenstein 
disagree with respect to almost every aspect of the novel. They disagree in regard to 
what is the novel’s genre. Lee Heller proposes that Frankenstein is exemplary of late 
Horror Gothic and, more specifically, Phylosophical Gothicism, while Ana Cláudia 
Giassone rejects this classification and proposes that Frankenstein is a precursor of the 
science fiction genre. Thus, Lee Heller argues that Horror Gothic transferred to print 
oral stories of the supematural and the sensational, had a controversial cultural status, 
eamed popular approval but hostile reviews fi-om the literary elite, and provided the 
conventions for Philosophical Gothicism. Philosophical Gothicism referred to a group 
of novelists who were interested in politics and human psychology, "explored the 
horrific elements of human personality, and the forces -  including education and 
reading -  that goes into their creation", and "offered a kind of scientific study of the 
making of human beings" {Frankenstein and the Cultural Uses o f Gothic 329). Ana 
Cláudia Giassone agrees that Shelley intended to provoke an effect of terror, but she 
disagrees with the classification of Frankenstein as a late exemplary of Horror Gothic. 
She proposes that Shelley’s novel evinces all the characteristics of the science fiction 
genre. Thus, the novel is a glance at the fiiture that questions the optimism of the 
prevailing theories of progress. It critically deals with the issue of the relationship 
between mankind and scientific development, as well as with the consequences of their 
relationship. It also addresses the issue of the tension between the artificial and the 
natural, the insertion of the mechanical within the human {O Mosaico de Frankenstein 
27-38).
43
Besides, these readings strongly disagree with regard to the values and principles 
held by Mary Shelley. She successively appears as a proper lady searching for 
happiness in a domestic life marked by self-denial, a rebel young lady searching for 
social recognition through acts of self-assertion, a woman divided between juvenile and 
adult impulses, and a defiant feminist writer. She is described as endorsing 
conservative views of the society of her age and the social turmoil it faced, as a 
supporter of a radically liberal heritage, or as a thinker holding ambivalent views and 
mixing revolutionary and conservative impulses. Thus, Poovey proposes that 
Frankenstein shows that Shelley was a woman divided between her juvenile crave for 
self-assertion and social recognition through acts of imaginative creation, on the one 
hand, and her adult view of home as the proper place for women who must believe in 
self-denial as the proper behavior of women in society, on the other. For Smith 
likewise, Frankenstein holds the same ambivalent position in political issues that 
characterized the writings of Shelley’s parents: a radical defense of individual rights 
against State and social conventions, a philanthropic sentiment of pity in regard to the 
miserable conditions of life of the lower classes in industrial cities, and a conservative 
fear with regard to the dangers to social order that would be represented by the rise, 
empowerment or even enfranchisement of the lower classes.
Finally, these readings radically disagree with regard to what the novel means 
and what its major characters symbolize. In the readings I have considered, 
Frankenstein has successively appeared as a debate on the separate spheres doctrine that 
emerged with the rise of the bourgeoisie as the socially dominant class in late 
Eighteenth Century Europe; a metaphor of the concems, fears and pity that the 
European intellectual elite of the early Nineteenth Century feh in regard to the industrial 
working class; an expression of the view of man as both a tabula rasa and a “noble
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savage,” and an expression of the concerns with the impact of reading and education on 
character building of young men, women and the lower classes; a criticism of the 
Westem utopia in regard to progress, science and technology (the “Westem 
technological creed”) motivated by fears regarding the loss of hxmianity amidst the 
optimism that followed industrialization, which holds, however, utopian elements; a 
symbol of woman’s fate in an androcentric society or a metaphor of the destiny of the 
working class. The novel appears, therefore, as a comment either on issues of historical 
or universal relevance; and its major characters and their relationships metaphorically 
represent diverse social agents, situations, or phenomena. As Giassone points out, the 
novel is a mosaic.
For Giassone, the question of fear is crucial for understanding Frankenstein. 
She argues that, in Frankenstein, fear fulfills the role of triggering a broader and deeper 
questioning in regard to the years in which Shelley lived, the values and utopias 
generated by the rationalization and desenchantment of the world, the development of 
science, and the faster pace of technological progress. This questioning proceeds by 
pointing out the limits of science, progress and technology, and the risks involved in 
dehumanizing mankind expressed through the introduction of the idea of the machinic 
man.^ The risks that science, technology and man’s attempts to exercise rational control 
over nature bring to mankind are expressed through the monstrosity of the Creature. He 
is monstrous because he cannot be classified: he is neither human, nor machine; neither 
natural, nor artificial; neither dead, nor alive; neither completely scientifically produced, 
nor magically; neither naturally bad, nor socially innocent (O Mosaico de Frankenstein 
57-58).^ These rissks are also epressed through the monstrosity of Victor Frankenstein. 
Indeed, Victor is monstrous insofar as he is unable to control and balance his rationality 
and his histerical impulses towards the creation of a new being and, further, towards its
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elimination. He has a monstruous ambition and craving for knowledge, control over 
natijre, defiance of religious dogma, and social recognition, which are fed by science 
and technological rationalism themselves and, thus, reveal the risks that science and 
technological rationalism bring to humanity (O Mosaico de Frankenstein 49). In 
Giassone’s view, Victor is even more monstruous than his Creature. The ugliness of the 
later is only physical, but we cannot avoid to symphatize with his sufferings, his 
feelings, his initial claims for human symphaty and social acceptance. We cannot avoid 
to considering him much more human than the men that condenm him because of his 
physiognomy. We cannot avoid considering him much more human than his creator, 
who is only able to fear, to hate, and to condemn him (O Mosaico de Frankenstein 57- 
58).
Giassone concludes that Frankenstein transfers to the fiiture the doubts raised by 
its cultural context. Furthermore, as the fear and terror it generates still endure, she 
proposes that we have not been able to answer the questions Shelley proposed in regard 
to science and technology, machines, and our human nature. Therefore, although 
Frankenstein is a dated interpretation of the tragic contents of modernity with its 
industries, railways, cities that rose ovemight, machinery that make wonders but can 
threat and destroy everything, its monster continues to terrorize us, because we have not 
been able to escape fi'om this demoniac face of modernity.
In Giassone’s interpretation, Frankenstein becomes a piece of social criticism 
that questions prevailing values and ideologies; it is a discourse fiill of skeptcism in 
regard to the theories of progress and the cult of revolution, which counters the 
prevailing ideologies; it is a dystopian view of progress, science and technology, which 
is exemplary of the view and discourse of British conservatives of Shelley’s age, who 
questioned the naïve certainties of progress because they shared a fear: the fear that.
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without limits, science and the advance of human omnipotence would endanger 
mankind (O Mosaico de Frankenstein 24-25). However, in its skepticism, social 
criticism, and ideological dystopia, Frankenstein never proposes the destruction of 
machines and the return to a pre-industrial era. On the contrary, Giassone persuasively 
argues that the novel contains two utopian elements. The first element that renders 
utopia possible is related to the De Lacey’s family as well as the values of commvinal 
life, the ideals of social cohesion and solidarity they stand for. In her treatment of the 
De Lacey’s family, Giassone proposes that “Mary Shelley points out the risks of 
scientific, industrial and urban development when they are not restrained by the 
simultaneous development of the structural qualities of communal cohesion among 
men” (O Mosaico de Frankenstein 83-84). The second element that renders utopia 
possible is related to the late decision of Victor Frankenstein’s symmetrical but reversed 
double: Walton. Giassone persuasively argues that when Walton abandons his 
enterprise, achieving what Victor was unable to accomplish (i.e., to restrain his ego and 
to control his crave for personnal accomplishments), he symbolizes Shelley’s hopes for 
the future of mankind (O Mosaico de Frankenstein 100). Significantly, the utopias that 
bring hope to Shelley -  who has also a dystopian view of her age -  are based on both 
the conception of the recovering of traditional sociality (the older order) and the 
conception of the recovering of human control and rational decision-making (the 
fundaments of the new order and the Westem technological creed).
*
To this point, I have reviewed the historical context in which Frankenstein was 
written and some paradigmatic readings that scholars who adhere to different theoretical 
orientations have made of the novel. I have particularly emphasized the readings that 
relate the novel to the Age of Revolutions, which suggest that the novel addresses the
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social changes that were haunting and frightening the imagination of ordinary people 
and the intellectual elites -  philosophers, social analysts, politicians -  of Europe. In the 
interpretation of the novel that follows, I will emphasize the readings related to the 
historical events experienced by Shelley. These readings see the novel as an expression 
of the different values and ideas of the Age of Revolutions. I intend to propose that the 
novel refers not only to the Age of Revolutions, but also includes a metaphorical 
representation of the phenomenon of social and cultural transition. It addresses two 
questions: What is contradictory and paradoxical in moments of transition? What do 
they provoke on people’s mind, views, feelings and attitudes? In my interpretation, to 
consider Frankenstein as a representation of the transitional is a first step to understand 
what it has to say about mankind’s increasing dependence upon technology since the 
Industrial Revolution.
r a
Frankenstein is a novel that deals with transition: its major characters are 
ambivalent and its meaning may be paradoxical. In other words, Shelley’s Frankenstein 
is characterized by ambivalences, conflicting values, multifaceted characters precisely 
because it is centered on the issue of social and cultural transition. A transition is a 
passage from a previous to a next stage, place, condition, social position or order, 
biographical or historical age. It is a passage after which the new replaces the older. 
Crucially, it is a passage during which the old no longer exists as it had been, the new 
does not fiilly exists yet. Therefore, from a social and cultural standpoint, it is a 
moment during which the older structures and pattems of social organization, the older 
cultural values, beliefs and references are no longer in effect and the new ones have not 
been completely established yet. It is the moment in between two different social 
orders. Universally, theses moments are socially ritualized. Studying rituals of passage
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(such as baptisms, marriages, burials), anthropologists have defined these moments of 
transition as liminal and the people they involve as neophytes. Indeed, they have 
defined a three stages flow on the rites of passages: an initial stage during which people 
are separated from their previous condition; a second stage characterized by a condition 
of limbo, liminality or marginality, during which “people have left one place or state but 
haven’t yet entered or joined the next”; and, a final stage of reintegration to society in a 
new condition, position or status {Cultural Anthropology 242). They have also 
characterized the liminal period as a social moment in which society is at risk because 
its structures of ordering the world and its pattems of social classification of people and 
events do not apply insofar as social hierarchies have been temporarily suspended (all 
neophytes are equals), and because cultural references have become imstable insofar as 
values and beliefs are mixed up. Thus “liminal people occupy ambiguous social 
positions. They exist apart from ordinary distinctions and expectation, living in a time 
out of time. They are cut off from normal social contacts” {Cultural Anthropology 242).
3
The Age of Revolutions that shook the late Eighteenth Century Westem Society 
created a long moment of transition and passage that involved most of the Westem 
society or, at least, of its most prominent and affluent social sectors and nations. During 
the Age of Revolutions, common people were so shocked with fast pace changes that
I
they looked terrified by scientific and technological inventions meant to rationalize the 
relationship between man and nature and to provoke the disenchantment of the world. 
Intellectuals in this period -  such as Shelley and her parents -  had ambivalent thoughts 
in regard to the new social order, marked by the presence of science and technology and 
how it would affect mankind’s condition and fiiture; the industrial working class -  one 
of the major “inventions” of the age -  provoked mixed feelings and anxieties, inspired
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fear and pity. It was during this period of limbo and insecurity, in which people were 
trying to understand both the demands and advantages of the new social order, and the 
values and beliefs of the older, that Frankenstein was written.
I would suggest that the novel focuses on the transitional or liminal character of 
the age and argue that the importance of transition fn Frankenstein is revealed in 
different ways, all of them related to the new cultural and technological values. In my 
attempt to understand what the representation of transition has to say about human 
increasing dependence upon technology, I will consider three questions; the 
contradictory, ambivalent, and marginal nature of its three central characters, all of them 
insecure in their travels, which are closely related to science and technologj'; the 
resource to the symbology of traveling; and the mixing of things that are ordinarily 
thought as being distmct, separated and opposed.
*
In Frankenstein, three major characters hold ambivalent feelings and 
contradictory sentiments. Walton dreams with adventures that send him far away from 
home and human society. Nevertheless, when he actually involves himself in his 
adventure, he is moved by the desire of being recognized by his personal abilities and 
merits rather than by the prestige of his family. Thus, he is proud because he renounced 
ease and luxury and “preferred glory to every enticement that wealth placed in [his] 
path’’ {Frankenstein 17). And yet, Walton dreams to meet a friend with whom he could 
share his adventures and feelings. He also writes letters to his sister and, through his 
narrative, builds cognitive bridges through which she and all of us (readers) -- i.e., 
society -  learn the lessons he teaches.
The Monster has a good nature; indeed, he is both a “noble savage” and a 
“tabula rasa”. Nevertheless, he commits abominable acts of violence upon the
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undeserving: the murders of William, Clerval and Elisabeth. He admires and craves for
acceptance among men, but nurtures resentment in regard to human society. He is
aware of his despicable creation and his monstrousity, but revengeful against those who
fear him -  “I will revenge my injuries; if I cannot inspire love, I will cause fear”
{Frankenstein 125). He both hates and loves his creator; he knows Victor has failed
him, blames his faults, but assumes his errors and represents Victor’s death as the sin
that he committed and mostly regrets:
No guilt, no mischief, no malignity, no misery, can be found comparable to 
mine. When I run over the frightful catalogue of my sins, I cannot believe that I 
am the same creature whose thoughts were once filled with sublime and 
transcendent visions of the beauty and the majesty of goodness.[...]
You, who call Frankenstein your fiiend, seem to have a knowledge of my crimes 
and his misfortunes. But, in the detail which he gave you of them, he could not 
sum up the hours and months of misery which I endured, wasting in impotent 
passions. For while I destroyed his hopes, I did not satisfy my own desires. [...] 
But it is true that I am a wretch. I have murdered the lovely and the helpless; I 
have strangled the innocent as they slept, and grasped to death his throat who 
never injured me or any other living thing. I have devoted my creator, the select 
specimen of all that is worthy of love and admiration among men, to misery; I 
have pursued him even to that irremediable ruin. There he lies, white and cold 
in death. You hate me; but your abhorrence carmot equal that with which I 
regard myself {Frankenstein 183-184).
In his case, as Lee Heller has pointed out, ambivalence derives from the 
contradiction between his nature, the social values he admires and the social experience 
he has:
What makes the monster's case hopeless is that there is no way to reconcile what 
he learns from books with what he experiences in his social relations. (...) In this 
the monster is a symbol of the violent potential of social instability, and of the 
danger posed by the discontinuity between the ideals that books imagine and the 
reality that such readers must confront.
(...) The monster represents the criminal potential of the uncontrolled, perhaps 
imcdntrollable lower classes, formed by the contradictory lessons of social and 
literary experience {Frankenstein and the Cultural Uses o f Gothic 337).
Victor is also a contradictory character. He narrates his childhood as a heaven
and acknowledges that it was so because of the love, affection and care with which he
was provided by his parents, but, from the onset and although he compares himself to a
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“father” and his creature to a “son”, he thinks of his relationship with his creature in 
terms of the gratitude the later should owe him. In one word, he brings together pattems 
of thinking and dealing with parent-child relationships that the Age of Revolutions had 
clearly separated: the indebted gratitude model from the past and the love-and-caring 
model for the fiiture. Thus, referring to the new species he was breeding, he concludes: 
“No father could claim the gratitude of his child so completely as I should deserve 
theirs”  ^{Frankenstein 55). He knows he is responsible for the creation of the Monster, 
but blames the Monster for his monstrosity. He leams from the Monster’s confession 
that his decision to abandon the creature caused the Monster’s crimes, but he intends 
revenge and lacks self-criticism. Victor leams from the Monster that he was good and 
compassionate, admired the virtues of social life and deprecated the vices of mankind. 
He also looked for human comprehension, helped other people (among the De Lacey 
and rescuing the girl who was drawning), and was rejected because of his appearance. 
He only committed crimes and violent acts after being harmed by society. 
Nevertheless, poisoned by his desire for revenge the deaths of William and Justine, 
Victor denies his responsibility for the Monster’s acts and cannot comprehend his 
feeling of revenge. He only in part acknowledges that the Monster is right and feels 
some compassion for him when they make the pact -  “I consent to your demand, on 
your solemn oath to quit Europe for ever, and every other place in the neighbourhood of 
man, as soon as I shall deliver into your hands a female who will accompany you in 
your exile” {Frankenstein 127). Victor, of course, will infiinge the pact.
♦
The main characters of Frankenstein are also marginal figures in regard to the 
society in which they live, and marginality is not only characteristic of liminal periods, 
but also a condition intrinsically marked by ambivalence. Walton’s journey is taken in
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isolation from his fellows; he fravels with men of lower classes that he regards with
prejudice and parental benevolence. Victor’s experiments are involved with mystery
and kept in secret until he meets Walton; none of his parents and friends learn about the
existence of the Monster or Victor’s responsibility for his breeding. They die in
ignorance. The Monster is quintessentially marginal. He has no place among men. He
leams “the strange system of human society,” hears of “the division of property, of
irrmiense wealth and squalid poverty; of rank, descent, and noble blood.” He
understands that a man is respected only if he holds “high and iinsullied descent united
with riches” and, if he lacks on them, he is considered “as a vagabond and a slave,
doomed to waste his powers for the profits of the chosen few!” He leams these lessons
and he denounces social conventions. Nevertheless, he is aware that men follow them
and humanity is mostly defined through them. So, being aware that “of my creation and
creator I was absolutely ignorant; but I knew that I possessed no money, no fiiends, no
kind of property” (Frankenstein 106), he tragically asks for the first time: “what was I?”
He also leams the difference of sexes, the birth and growth of children, and “the various
relationships which bind one human being to another in mutual bonds.” Nevertheless,
he is aware that he has no fiiends, no father, no mother, no remembrances of childhood,
and then he will repeat the question that reveals his feeling of marginality and
ambivalence once more: “What was I?”
As the Monster’s answer reveals, the use of the interrogative pronoun “what”
(instead of “who”) in both questions is not coincidental. On the contrary, it reveals the
Monster’s sense of himself as both, a thing or object and as a humanlike being:
I was, besides, endued with a figure hideously deformed and loathsome; I was 
not even of the same nature as man. I was more agile than they, and could 
subsist upon coarser diet; I bore the extremes of heat and cold with less injury to 
my frame; my stature far exceeded theirs. When I looked around, I saw and 
heard of none like me. Was I then a monster, a blot upon the earth, from which 
all men fled, and whom all men disowned? (Frankenstein 106)
53
54
Thus, his answer states his marginality (and, therefore, his ambivalence -  which is the 
ambivalence of the cyborg species as a whole) in regard to human society, his 
monstrosity among men. Every character in the novel, including the Monster himself, 
shares .this view: the Monster is monstrous. As Ana Claudia Giassone has argued, the 
idea of monstrosity is related less to aesthetic evaluations than to the singularity that 
renders its classification impossible (O Mosaico de Frankenstein 9, nota 1). We may 
add that the idea of monstrosity is also connected to the idea of ambiguity. Like 
everything that is singular, everything that is ambiguous is impossible to classify. Thus, 
singular or ambiguous, the figure of the Monster reveals the limits of the prevailing 
system of classification and the limits of the order of the world it generates. It is, 
therefore, deeply related with the idea of transition -  the idea of a stage, place or 
condition in which classifications do not apply and the order of the world is temporarily 
suspended. Monstrosity makes the Monster adequately representative of both what is 
generally associated with transition and what was being specifically related to the 
transition represented by the Age of Revolutions.
*
Throughout the novel, Shelley makes fi^equent the use of another ordinary 
symbol of transition: travels. She not only multiplies the number of travels, but also 
presents travels as a structuring principle of her novel’s plot. Walton, Victor 
Frankenstein and the Monster have at least this characteristic in common: they are 
travelers and they wander around. They are neophytes involved in adventurous 
journeys: Walton’s conquest of the pole, Victor’s conquest of knowledge and rational 
control over nature, the Monster’s conquest of who he is. They do not know fi’om the 
onset what they will find at the end of their journeys. At the end, they vwll not be what 
they were before.
Thus, Walton was looking for actual adventures and meets the narrative of an 
adventure in face of which his advetitures in the North Sea become pale: the story of the 
Monster told by Victor. He was expecting to remain isolated and fmds a friend. He 
was searching for personal gratification and social recognition through acts of self- 
assertion and finds them through an act of self-renunciation and altruism. Victor was 
also searching for personal gratification and social recognition through acts of self- 
assertion, but meets personal suffering and promotes the destruction of all the others 
who are socially significant to his life. He was searching for rational control over nature 
and human subversion of the laws of destiny (both nature and destiny represented by the 
irreversible cycle of life and death) and encounters forces he does not control and which 
guide his life -  he meets destiny in the figure of his Creature. He intends to breed a new 
and fitter species of beings, but comes to a compromise with the preservation of 
mankind (God’s creatures) -  so he destroys the monsterette and consciously faces the 
Monster’s revenge. He craves for knowledge, but realizes that ignorance is the 
condition of happiness. The Monster was seeking to understand what or who he was; he 
finds the contradiction between his good nature and feelings and his monstrous 
appearance and social image. He craves for being socially defined, to find his place in 
society, but discovers that the monstrosity of his origins makes him unclassifiable, 
uncomprehensible, unacceptable and dangerous to society and mankind. Then, he seeks 
revenge, but finds himself tom to shreds by its accomplishment.
Surely their travels follow different paths. Travels have a crucial meaning in 
Victor Frankenstein’s life and I shall distinguish his travels from his journey. Since he 
becomes a grown up man and chooses to pursue his dreams, Victor is always on the 
move. It is not coincidental that his first departure from home, which he later sees as an 
omen of his fate, is delayed by his mother’s death. On the contrary, departure from
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home and mother’s death clearly mean a rupture with childhood and Victor’s passage 
from the condition of a child -  protected and dependent upon his parents -  to manhood
-  self-responsibility for his actions. This first trip is paradigmatic to the others he 
makes, because of the ambivalence of feelings that affect him. His sentiments are 
mixed up: he is afraid because home seclusion and protection had made himself “totally 
unfitted for the company of strangers,” but he is pushed by the ardent desire of 
acquiring knowledge and the sentiment that he had to enter the world and take a “station 
among other human beings” {Frankenstein 45).
His travels will always be described in terms of a sense of freedom and loss; 
they will have the emblem of monotony and delirium related with the fevers he feels; 
when traveling, Victor seems to be suspended in a time beyond time. Whatever 
happens to him is of lesser importance than what is happening to his beloved ones. He 
is unaware of the danger, but the reader of the novel comes quickly to cormect his 
travels with a family tragedy in the making. Thus, Victor’s trips always present a 
specter of danger; a tragedy is always related with them: his mother’s death, William’s 
murder, and Clerval’s assassination. In Victor’s life, traveling -  i.e., transition -  is a 
dangerous event. While he is traveling, while he is making a passage, his society is 
destroyed. When he makes a trip, his family world and social life change radically. 
Travels annihilate the past paradise in which he was bom; present life is mean; fiiture is 
threatened.
His journey reproduces this scheme. It is a complete passage from heaven to 
hell. Victor starts by breaking the bonds with his paradisiacal family environment. 
Later he will be nostalgic and he will feel peace only at the mountains and lakes that 
surround the provincial scenario of his childhood. Meanwhile, the process of growing 
into manhood makes him to leave his home, to come to town, to defy God and nature, to
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create the Monster (by creating the creature and abandoning it) that will hunt him,
world to fall apart without being able to do whatever is needed to protect and preserve 
it. He loses most of what he cares for; he loses his past and he keeps secret with regard 
to the reason of his misery. It is a quite anti-social phase of his life; he remains alone 
and isolated; he only chats with the Monster, who is as isolated as himself. They make 
a pact through which both will be able to come back to society and have a future; but, 
then, Victor re-encounters society and mankind through an act of sudden awareness and 
personal sacrifice. He does not protect the word he gave for his anti-social fellow, 
destroys the monsterette, condemns Clerval and Elisabeth (friendship and family) to 
destruction, and both lose their future in society. Like the Monster, Victor Frankenstein 
has no one special to care for. He cares for mankind as a whole and dies as altruistically 
as he has egoistically lived.
The Monster’s also portrays his search for an identity as a trip. He awakes, is 
abandoned and immediately flees the town in which he was created and repelled. He 
finds himself in the midst of the forest. There he becomes aware of his senses, feelings, 
body and life, but he is an urban made cyborg rather than an animal or a primitive 
himian being. His needs cannot be provided by wilderness and nature. Perhaps he is 
noble, perhaps he is monstrous, but he is definitely not a savage. He needs to be 
nurtured and to be sheltered. He leaves the forest and finds the first human made 
structure he remembers: the small hut of the old shepherd -  significantly a transitional 
place between the isolation of the wilderness and the social world. He does not care 
that the old man fled terrified, he eats his food and sleeps. He arrives to a rural village 
that amazes him, but whose dwellers are terrified by his presence and attack him. He 
flees to the open country and takes refuge in the hovel beneath the De Lacey’s cottage.
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There, he will finally meet society, learn its good values, and know who he is. Thus, he 
went through stages from forest to shepherd’s ground, to cultivated fields, and to 
peasant villages. He left nature to enter society and to be repelled by society. He was 
condemned to be socialized without fully entering or being accepted by society. He 
relates to society through a hole in the wall of the De Lacey’s cottage: near but 
segregated, present but unperceived, there but paradoxically not completely there.
What society is this that the Monster admires? I agree with Giassone that the 
Monster considers that the De Laceys have taught him the good values of a traditional 
and rural way of life, the solid social references provided by an ancient social order and 
a stable pattern of social organization. Nevertheless, I disagree from her description of 
the De Laceys as exemplary of this traditional pre-revolutionary rural society. On the 
contrary, they are an urban upper class family trapped in a rural setting because of 
deceiving and betrayal. In this sense, the De Lacey parallels the Monster, because they 
are as dislocated as he is from their original setting. Besides, they are not happy with 
their conditions of life in the field. What matters, however, is that the Monster thinks 
the De Laceys represent the best human and social values he has learnt from the good 
books he read, and he hopes they will accept him by who he thinks he is and in spite of 
the appearance and origins he knows he has. He expects they (the good society) will 
give him the identity and the social place he deserves for his good nature and feelings.
As his monstrosity is abhorred, the Monster leams that he has no place in human 
society. Through stages he has come from the animal who lives m the wilderness to the 
humanlike being that craves for companionship and vmderstanding and back again to the 
wilderness. No wonder he bums the De Lacey’s cottage to the ground. Thus, the 
Monster is in the move anew. Now he travels to fulfill his revenge against his creator. 
He travels “only at night, fearful of encovintering the visage of a human being”
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(Frankenstein 121). The gunshot that wounds him after he saved the life of the girl who 
had fallen on the stream corroborates his marginality, and he vows “eternal hatred and 
vengeance to all mankind” (Frankensteinl22). Human aggressions have finally 
rendered the Monster monstrous.
However, when he meets Victor Frankenstein, he asks for comprehension and 
forgiveness. He had killed William and fi-amed up Justine. He wants Victor to 
understand his deeds, to accept his responsibility for them, to keep his promise to give 
him a mate, and to trust that he will leave mankind in peace because he is aware that he 
does not belong to himian society, but to the wilderness. Victor does believe him, for a 
while; but he does not deliver the monsterette. Revenge is accomplished. Elisabeth is 
murdered, the futxare of Victor is destroyed, and both Victor and the Monster are 
condenmed to be the only reason for each other’s life. Destiny is fulfilled and the 
Monster re-encounters his good nature after Victor’s death. Having no more reasons to 
live, he vows to die. The silence of the author in regard to his actual death transfers this 
decision to the readers, who might imderstand it as both necessary and unjust.
Among the main characters, Walton is the one who is involved in the most 
conventional journey: he is going to conquer the pole or to die! Nevertheless, if Walton 
travels because he is moved by a desire for knowledge, self-fulfillment, and social 
recognition, he departs from his origins, but he does not want to lose completely the 
bonds with them. He writes letters to his sister and only family member alive. No 
matter how far away from human society he intends to go, he is not renouncing society 
and he makes a narrational effort to keep in touch with family. It is a narrational effort 
to preserve his ties with the world he comes from. He conceives of traveling as 
adventurous and risky, but his travel implies a retum. Society remains referential and 
unscathed. Meanwhile, his travel brings him something he does not expect, he has
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never had before, but he has always longed for: a fiiend, a man with whom he feels 
intimacy, communion and equality (as we saw, defining characteristics of the neophyte 
in the liminal period). He will lose his fiiend and he will be back to society, becoming a 
new man. He is no longer the mirror of the early Victor Frankenstein, who craves for 
more than human powers, but a mirror of the late Victor Frankenstein, who dares to face 
the Monster’s rage only to protect mankind. As Giassone points out, Walton comes 
back to give hope to mankind; a hope related to men’s capacity to be in control of their 
ambition and impulses, acts and creations. Of course, this is a hope that embodies a 
profound ambivalence v^th regard to technology, science and progress as both a threat 
and a perfect salvation.
*
The importance of transition and ambivalence is finally expressed insofar as 
whatever is ordinarily conceived of as separated and opposite, Frankenstein brings 
closer and mixes together: noble origins and humble living conditions, rural and urban 
life, science and magic, reason and mystery. Thus, women of noble or affluent origins -  
as Caroline, Elisabeth and Justine -  are encountered and rescued from humble homes 
and miserable situations to which they do not belong and which they do not deserve. 
Furthermore, when the Monster meets the De Laceys, they are living in a himible 
cottage in the countryside, as rural laborers, but the old man was “descended fi-om a 
good family in France, where he had lived for many years in affluence, respected by his 
superiors, and beloved by his equals. His son was bred in the service of his country; 
and Agatha had ranked with ladies of the highest distinction,” and “they had lived in a 
large and luxurious city, called Paris, surrounded by fiiends, and possessed of every 
enjoyment which virtue, refinement of intellect, or taste, accompanied by a moderate 
fortune, could afford” {Frankenstein 107). In short, as their unknown guest and
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apprentice, the De Laceys are urbanites exiled in the countryside. The De Lacey family  
and the Monster mean a penetration of the rural by the urban, and it is not merely 
coincidental that rural dwellers cannot comprehend the Monster’s gestures of kindness, 
feel terrified in his presence, and react violently. In this sense, the Monster seems to 
represent the new urban, industrial, and progressive world that -  according to Giassone
-  ordinary people of rural origins and references face with perplexity, astonishment and 
terror.
Finally, Victor’s thirst for rational knowledge and control upon natural laws 
always mix elements of different and opposite realms or categories of the system of 
social classification that prevailed in the age. Victor leams both the earthly-based 
modem sciences of an enlightened age and the ancient chimerical philosophical theories 
of Comelius Agrippa, Albertus Magnus and Paracelsus. He is trapped by the secular 
and the disenchanted world that science announced. Hence, after his meeting with 
professor Krempe, Victor states: “the ambition of the enquirer seemed to limit itself to 
the annihilation of those visions of which my interest in science was chiefly founded. I 
was required to exchange chimeras of boxmdless grandeur for realities of little worth” 
{Frankenstein 46). Science ultimately forces Victor to meet his fate. He leams that the 
modem sciences -  curiously sciences that shoiild have promoted the rationalization and 
desenchantment of the world -  have penetrated “into the recesses of nature” and have 
shown “how she works in her hiding places”; they have “ascended into the heavens, 
discovered how the blood circulates, and the nature of the air we breathe. They have 
acquired new and almost unlimited powers; they can command the thunders of heaven, 
mimic the earthquake, and even mock the invisible world with its own shadows.” Thus, 
Victor will choose to retum to his ancient studies and to “pioneer a new way, [to]
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explore unknown powers, and [to] unfold to the world the deepest mysteries of
creation” {Frankenstein 49).
Between science and alchemy, reason and mystery, desenchanted and enchanted
worlds, Krempe and Waldman, Victor makes no choice. He brings both together and
builds his creature. Although the process of breeding the monster and the monsterette is
never fully described, I leam from Victor’s description that it involved a public stage
and a hidden one; the latter can be divided in two phases: the phase of discovery of the
causes of generation and life and the phase of creation of a living being. The early
public stage is plainly rational, technological and scientific; Victor discovers
“improvements of some chemical instruments” that render him “great esteem and
admiration at the university” (Frankenstein 53). In this sense, he is a scientist.
Nevertheless, he attributes the discovery of the causes of generation and life and his
capability to “bestowing animation upon lifeless matter” to a miracle -  i.e., a mysterious
element. Furthermore, he is reserved about this subject in spite of the eagerness, the
wonder and the hope he observes in Walton’s eyes, and he argues that he will keep the
secret because of the danger involved with the acquirement of such knowledge.'* Victor,
who craved for knowledge, praises ignorance as happiness: “how much happier that
man is who believes that his native town to be the world, that he who aspires to become
greater than his nature will allow” (Frankenstein 55).
Victor’s early discovery involves mysteries and miracles; his science engenders
dangers; his knowledge requires secrecy and is better forgotten. It is the consequence of
the application of his discovery that changes Victor’s mind. The process of building the
being of gigantic stature is never revealed; but we know that Victor adheres to technical,
rational and scientific attitudes and procedures:
I prepared myself for a multitude of reverses my operations might be incessantly 
baffled, and at last my work be imperfect; yet when I considered the
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improvement which every day takes place in science and mechanics, I was 
encouraged to hope my present attempts would at least lay the foundations of 
future success” {Frankenstein 55).
Nevertheless, secrecy involves these procedures with an aura of mystery and
both Victor’s and the Monster’s recollections are surrounded by an aura of horror. We
know that Victor has described it step by step and was horrified with it through the
Monster’s narrative and because, when Victor is trying to reproduce it for building the
monsterette, he describes it as a filthy, horrible, irksome process to which he was early
engaged because, as he puts it, “a kind of enthusiastic fireri2y  had blinded [him] to the
horror of [his] employment”, but which now, in cold blood, made his “heart often
sickened at the work of [his] hands” {Frankenstein 139). The process is so horrible that
the Monster himself is disgusted with his accursed origin;
The whole detail of that series of disgusting circumstances which produced it, is 
set in view: the minutest description of my odious and loathsome person is 
given, in language which painted your own horrors, and rendered mine indelible. 
I sickened as I read. “Hateful day when I received life!’ I exclaimed in agony. 
‘Accursed creator! Why did you form a monster so hideous that even you tumed 
from me in disgust? God, in pity, made man beautiful and alluring, after his 
own image; but my form is a fillhy type of yours, more horrid even from the 
very resemblance. Satan had his companions, fellow-evils, to admire and 
encourage him; but I am solitary and abhorred’ {Frankenstein 113).
Victor’s creature, of course, is monstrous because ambivalent -  half a thing
technologically built, half a human being; half generated by science, half generated by
miraculous powers; half modem and disenchanted, half archaic and mysterious; the
highest conquer of civilization and the wildest beast. Victor’s experiment and his
creature reveal Shelley’s conception of science as mysterious and, therefore, as less
scientific than it intended to be; it reveals her conception of science as able to engender
dangers and, as I shall see soon, her conception of these dangers as threatening to
mankind.
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Frankenstein is a story of transition, in general, and the transition represented by 
the Age of Revolutions, in particular. The novel dramatizes the transition to modernity 
and industrial society and the perplexity of those experiencing it. As a representation of 
mankind’s dependence upon technology in the last centuries, the novel deals with a few 
important themes; (1) the generation of the first prosthetics cyborg in literary history;
(2) the focus on the limits between the human and the mechanical; (3) the representation 
of technology as adversarial to mankind; and, (4) the presentation of dystopian views of 
technology, science and progress amidst a cultural universe and a historical moment that 
comprise the early phase of the hegemony of the Westem technological creed.
The first element -  the generation of one prosthetics cyborg -  justifies my 
interpretation of Frankenstein as Shelley’s attempt to represent the transitional 
ambivalences of the age in which she lived. Shelley chose to represent her transitional 
age through two men who craved for social recognition of their scientific achievements 
and, especially, through the Monster who brings them together and changes their 
destiny. This choice is not coincidental. On the contrary, it serves to represent and to 
criticize the Age of Revolutions and the emergence of Modernity. Victor and Walton 
are men who aim to go beyond the limits traditionally imposed on mankind, but 
ultimately monstrosity is their major achievement. For both repentance is necessary as 
a condition that makes possible a retum to mankind.
The Age of Revolutions was a turning point in the history of Westem societies. 
It was the takeover of the Ancient Regime, its beliefs and values, its worldview, and its 
traditional referential guidances. The iiniverse was re-centered and tiie sources of tmth 
and knowledge changed. Man took the place of God, reason replaced belief, science
replaced religion, and human will replaced human compliance. Last but not least, a 
sense of human mastery and control over nature and its forces replaced the bondages of 
fate. New limits were set for hiraian reason, will, capacity of production, freedom, 
desires for power and control, and these new limits were deeply related to rationality, 
science, technology and machines. Indeed, machines in particular, technology and 
science, in general, were major determinants of the expansion of the limits of the himian 
for men who were entering Modernity and, as we have also seen, throughout the Age of 
Revolutions, machines, in particular, technology and science, in general, achieved a 
major importance in human life because they defined the new horizons for mankind.
Frankenstein does more than state and represent the limits of Modem Man. 
Through the figure of the Monster, the process of his breeding, and Victor’s repentance, 
achieved through Walton’s abandonment of his endeavor, Frankenstein criticizes the 
dangers and ambivalences of technology and machines. The novel suggests that they 
amoimt to a threat to mankind, and reveals a conception of human beings as hostile to 
machines. Finally, the novel points to the path mankind must follow to avoid the 
dangers of technology.
No matter how important machines, technology and science became in the Age 
of Revolutions, they remained ambivalent and fiightening for most people at least 
throughout the early stages of Modernity. Machines, technology and science were able 
to promote material wealth as well as social injustice, good as well as evil. They filled 
people with wonder, perplexity and terror. Electricity is the best example of these early 
ambivalences towards technology. An invisible natural force, it could make good and
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evil things occur (from the lighting of a lamp to the killing of a man), but it could not be 
seen. Visible in its effects and invisible in its working, electricity was both scientific
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and mysterious. Throughout the Age of Revolutions and the early stage of Modernity, 
science, technology and machines, in general, shared this ambivalence of meaning.
The Monster dramatizes both the expansion of the limits of the human through 
science and technology and tiie risks and dangers involved in the use of technology. 
Both the Creature and the process of his generation are critical issues in the transition to 
Modernity, because they suggest the ambivalence and perplexity that characterized the 
Age of Revolutions, question the consequences of the historical process of redefinition 
of the borders that had traditionally defined mankind, and point to the risks related to 
their crossing. The fabrication of the monster implies a criticism of scientific 
modernity. The Monster Victor has created is half man, half machine. Better, the 
Monster is man made as a machine or commodity, but replicates man’s process of 
development of mind, education, cravings and feelings. The Monster is a cyborg -  a 
crossover of the boundary between nature and artifact, human and machine -  whose 
generation is related to science and technology, especially in that his generation 
involves the use of electricity (with its aura of mystery and science).
I have already shown how adequate the choice of a monster is as representative 
of transitional ages in which cultural references are lost, blurred, or mixed up, criteria of 
social classification and comprehension of beings, events and phenomena are 
temporarily suspended, and ambivalence prevails. Ambivalence is also characteristic of 
cyborgs. Choosing to create a monster that is a cyborg, Shelley not only finds a precise 
representation of the ambivalences that characterize any transitional age, but she also 
reveals and renders problematic the only principle of social classification that the Age 
of Revolutions had left unscathed: the discontinuity between the human and the 
machine.
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Like any cyborg, the Monster erases the distance between man and machines. As 
Bruce Mazlish has pointed out, the actual erasure of this discontinuity is a recent 
phenomenon. Indeed, it is an erasure still in the making in our cyber-age. But 
Frankenstein's Monster is an imaginative or literary presage of such an erasure. He 
announces its possibility and, crucially, he does so in a way that makes it horrifying and 
dangerous. In doing so, he reveals the way the Nineteenth Century conceived of the 
relationship between mankind and technology. In the man/machine relationship, the 
two sets of value are exclusive: a human being could not be a machine and vice-versa.
The Monster stands for a criticism of Modernity and of the Westem 
Technological Creed because his existence or, at least, the possibility of his existence is 
thought of as a risk and a danger that the increasing reliance and dependence upon 
science and technology brings to humanity. Two facts in the novel deserve particular 
attention. First, there are three reasons that make the Monster as a cyborg successively 
to appear monstrous and terrifying to his Modem creator. Secondly, these reasons add 
their effects together and bring a change on the beliefs, behavior and attitudes of the 
Monster’s Modem creator.
From the moment the Monster opens his eyes, he scares his creator because he 
erases the discontinuity between the human and the machine that the Age of 
Revolutions had emphasized in its redefinition of the human. By bringing together what 
should remain apart, the Monster produces a blurring of fi-ontiers that threatens to 
destroy the very concept of humanity.
Later, fi-om the moment the Monster starts to haunt and to destroy Victor’s life, 
he becomes terrifying to his Modem creator for another reason. Now he is scary not 
only as a result of his ambivalent and disturbing nature; he is scary also because he 
intends to take charge, to be in control, to subdue the man who created him. This form
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of terror reveals that the discontinuity between the human and the machine involves a 
hierarchy as well as a classification. Hxmian and machines are not only different or 
opposite; they should also be conceived as being in a relationship in which machines are 
subordinated to man. When the Monster -  the artifact -  starts his revenge, Victor -  the 
Modem man -  fears him and caimot put an end to his deeds. On the contrary, Victor 
finds himself in the position of a man who has to comply with the demands of his 
artifact and has to work for him. Modem man has become the slave of his creature and 
the hierarchy conceived of by Modernity is reversed. Hence the relationship between 
Victor and the Monster, the claims and threats the later makes, and the fact that Victor 
has to comply with them, bring up the specter that science and technology can breed a 
new world in which machines would seize control.
Finally, fi:om the moment in which Victor complies with the Monster’s demand 
for a companionship and starts the filthy process of creation of the Monster’s 
companion, the Monster becomes horrifying to his Modem creator for another but still 
complementary reason. Now, the Monster becomes the half machine, half human 
being, the prosthetic cyborg who brings not only the specter of a world in which 
machines seize control and power and submit mankind, but also the specter of a world 
in which machines are endowed with the demiurgean power of creating and breeding 
themselves, become fully independent from mankind, and can move a final war against 
mankind. It is the specter of a world in which the demiurgean power that the Age of 
Revolutions transferred from God to His creatures would be seized by the creatures of 
these lesser gods: men. It is the specter of a world Victor cannot accept. Thus, Victor 
suddenly becomes altraistic to the point of sacrificing his hope, happiness and future, 
his science and wisdom. It is the specter of this world that will definitely reverse the
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perspective and the endeavors of the Modem man, causing both Victor’s and Walton’s 
repentance.
From the perspective of a study of the representations of the human dependence
upon technology, Victor’s dilemma during the process of creation of the female
monster, his awakening to the scope of the terror he was creating, his transformation
from selfish to socially concerned man, and his final decision to “tear to pieces the
thing” are the climax of Frankenstein. Moved by the Monster discourse, Victor has
worked on the creation of the monsterette “with a tremulous and eager hope.”
Suddenly, however, he is struck by a revelation:
I sat one evening in my laboratory; the sun had set, and the moon was just rising 
from the sea; I had not sufficient light for my employment, and I remained idle, 
in a pause of consideration of whether I should leave my labour for the night, or 
hasten its conclusion by an umemitting attention to it. As I sat, a train of 
reflection occurred to me, which led me to consider the effects of what I was 
now doing. Three years before I was engaged in the same manner, and had 
created a fiend whose unparalleled barbarity had desolated my heart, and filled it 
for ever with the bitterest remorse. I was now about to form another being of 
whose dispositions I was alike ignorant; she might become ten thousand times 
more malignant than her mate, and delight, for its own sake, in murder and 
wretchedness. He had sworn to quit the neighbourhood of man, and hide 
himself in deserts; but she had not; and she, who in all probability was to 
become a thinking and reasoning animal, might refiise to comply with a compact 
made before her creation. They might even hate each other; the creature who 
already lived loathed his own deformity, and might he not conceive a greater 
abhorrence for it when it came before his eyes in the female form? She also 
might turn vdth disgust from him to the superior beauty of man; she might quit 
him, and he be again alone, exasperated by the fresh provocation of being 
deserted by one of his own species.
Even if they were to leave Europe, and inhabit the deserts of the new world, yet 
one of the first results of those sympathies for which the daemon thirsted would 
be children, and a race of devils would be propagated upon the earth, who might 
make the very existence of the species of man a condition precarious and full of 
terror. Had I a right, for my own benefit, to inflict this curse upon everlasting 
generations? I had before been moved by the sophisms of the being I had 
created; I had been struck senseless by his fiendish threats; but now, for the first 
time, the wickedness of my promise burst upon me; I shuddered to think that 
future ages might curse me as their pest, whose selfishness had not hesitated to 
buy its own peace at the price, perhaps, of the existence of the whole himian 
race.
I trembled [...] and trembling with passion, tore to pieces the thing on which I 
was engaged. The wretch saw me destroy the creature on whose future existence
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he depended for happiness, and, with a howl of devilish despair and revenge,
withdrew {Frankenstein 140-141).
At this climatic moment, the Monster becomes frightening to Victor essentially 
because he intends to become able to reproduce himself and to become equal to man. 
From the Monster’s perspective, no matter how far in the wilderness he would live with 
his companion, having a mate would awake the best feelings and sentiments he had 
learnt from the ideal narratives of social life. A mate would make him human. This 
hope and belief are the sophisms that move Victor to comply with his demands. 
Nevertheless, when Victor reflects upon the friture, the generation of the female monster 
becomes scary precisely because she would provide the Monster with the power of 
breeding a new race that would constitute a double, a challenge, a threat, and a natural 
contender to mankind. The monsterette would provide to the Monster with the last 
requirement he lacks to expand his power to the point of the frill emulation of mankind: 
the ability to generate other beings like himself rather than human feelings and values.
As machines were seen as opposite to the human, and technology was feared as 
an opponent to mankind, the cyborg with the power of breeding other beings of its own 
species appears as modem man’s worst nightmare. When Victor destroys the Monster’s 
mate, he not only denies the Monster the right and the power to replicate human 
feelings, sentiments and life, but he also denies him the right and the power to become 
independent from mankind and to seize definitive control upon his destiny. He accepts 
his personal curse to save mankind. Indeed, when he tears to pieces the monsterette, he 
renounces his early endeavor to become Godlike and he completes his joumey -  his 
passage -  back to human society. He becomes aware of social problems, announces 
Walton’s retum, and defines the hopes of mankind in a Modem world: man must 
remain in control of his creatures; machines must remain at his service.
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The reading I have proposed has as its central concem the way Shelley’s 
Frankenstein dealt with the issue of the influence of technology upon culture and 
humankind, exploring how it portrayed the emergence of this primitive “prosthetics 
cyborg” -  the Monster. I read Frankenstein as a modem approach to human 
dependence on technology. I see the novel as an early answer to the increasing 
dependence of mankind to technology, and the hopes and fears it awakens.
In my reading, I propose that while Victor’s and Walton’s endeavors state the 
new limits set by Modernity to mankind, the breeding of the Monster criticizes the a- 
critical euphoria and optimism with which these phenomena were conceived of by the 
emerging but already prevailing ideology -  the Westem technological creed. The 
conception of a Monster being created through science and technology introduces an 
element of criticism, doubt, concem and fear in regard to both the new limits imposed 
on mankind and to the euphoria that followed the Age of Revolutions with regard to 
man’s control over nature, the inevitability of progress and civilization, and the 
advantages of technical evolution and scientific development. In doing so, 
Frankenstein sheds light on the perspective of the iintellectual elites in relation to 
Westem society, and its increasing dependence and reliance upon rationality, science 
and technology. It shows that this perspective was ambivalent. It was shaped by both 
the utopia of the Westem Technological Creed -  the belief on material progress, on the 
evolution of mankind towards civilization, on the emancipating role of science and 
technology -  and a dystopian view of progress. Reason, science and technology -  in
♦
which machines might become opponents to mankind and capable of breeding other 
machines.
In the novel, as I have suggested, this double allegiance to dystopian and utopian 
views produces radical instability and ambivalence. The Monster appears monstrous to 
modem men precisely because he brings together what they think has to remain apart: 
the human and the machine. And his breeding is dystopian because dangerous to 
mankind -  they bear the fiightening threat of machines able to seize the control man 
should keep upon them and, worse, to create new machines that would contend with 
mankind. As symbol of these threats, the scientifically and technologically 
manufactured Monster condemns science and technology. Nevertheless, through the 
decisions and fate of both Victor and Walton, Shelley suggests that the way out of this 
dilemma rests on the possibility that human beings have of reencountering the good 
values of society. Not surprisingly, throughout the novel, these good values are held, 
cared for and supported by the Monster himself Victor and Walton, in fact, only find 
them at the end of their passage and because of the terror they faced throughout their 
passage.
How this view of the relationship between mankind and technology has changed 
from Modemity to Post-Modemity, from Frankenstein to The Matrix is the object of the 
next chapter. Indeed, through the comparison between Frankenstein and The Matrix, I 
intend to consider how the imaginary of cyborgs has evolved, how it has shaped our 
sense of humanity and our imagination of the relationship between technology and 
mankind. I also intend to be able to analyze the power of narratives as instruments of 
reproduction, challenge and transformation of social stmctures of power and of 
hegemonic cultural models.
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NOTES:
* Johanna M. Smith supports this position (Biographical and Historical Contexts 
15-17). She sees the association between the Monster of Frankenstein and the working 
class as explanatory of the ambivalence between revolutionary and conservative 
impulses that characterizes Shelley’s Frankenstein. This issue is considered in more 
detail, below.
 ^ Giassone argues that science was involved in the early Nineteenth Century 
with the constmction of automatons and states that automatons were source of great fear 
among the population {O Mosaico de Frankenstein, 54). She also refers to other literary 
works of the same period -  such as Blake’s poem The Tiger -  that addressed the issue 
of the social concem and fear that involved the figure of the automaton and shared 
Shelley’s perspective of a fundamental contradiction between industrial, technological 
and scientific progress towards a richer world, on the one hand, and moral progress 
towards more justice iu human relations, on the other. She points out that Blake’s poem 
represents the process of industrialization as both a magnificient and a perverse 
phenomenon and emphasizes the risk of mechanization (or desiimanization) of all 
human relationships (O Mosaico de Frankenstein 74-79).
 ^ Li this sense, the central statement on Johanna Smith’s Cooped Up is quite 
accurate. By comparing the pedagogies followed by Victor’s parents and by Victor in 
relation to the Monster, Shelley seems to be debating the issue of good and bad
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pedagogies and confronting the pattem of indebted gratitude with the pattem of parental 
affection.
 ^ Indeed, there is no reference to how Victor bestows animation upon lifeless 
matter, except for those presented at the preface Shelley wrote for the 1831 edition of 
the novel and for the narration of the terrible thunderstorm Victor watched as a child 
{Frankenstein 41).
CHAPTER in
MATRIX:
A CONTEMPORARY APPROACH TO MANKIND’S DEPENDENCE ON
TECHNOLOGY
In Chapter II, I have proposed that, as a modem approach to mankind’s dependence 
upon technology, Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein dramatizes concerns related with the erasure 
of the discontinuity between the human and the machine. The novel heavily criticizes man’s 
arrogance and illusion of omnipotence; includes both utopian and dystopian views of 
progress, science and technology; reveals concerns in regard to artifacts and machines that 
hold the power to create other artifacts and machinery -  thus, Victor Frankenstein denies to 
his creature and Mary Shelley denies to her cyborg, in particular, and to machines, in general, 
the demiurgean power that man has attributed to Gods and to himself; and portrays machines 
as opponents to mankind and technology and as a danger to human essence. The Matrix 
addresses these questions from a different perspective.
I
In Chapter I, I argued that the overwhelming dependence of our contemporary post­
modern society upon technology changed human beings into cyborgs and our identities into 
terminal identities (to recover Scott Bukatman’s expression). Utopian and dystopian views of 
the information, digital and electronic technologies seem to agree on this respect. Their initial 
agreement vsith regard to the cyborgization of the human being, its society, and culture spurs.
however, problematic views of: (1) the forms of sociability in which we can now engage, (2) 
our capacity to protect individual freedom, independence of mind and will in face of the new 
structures and strategies of the exercise of power to which we are submitted within society, 
and (3) our capacity to remain human. On the one hand, dystopian views argue that our 
society has become the realm of the spectacle in virtue of the operation of highly developed 
technologies of information and conmiunication, and we have become imprisoned within the 
spectacle. Becoming cyborgs, we become “buttonheads”.’ On the other, utopian views 
suggest that the new technologies have enabled cyber-human beings to engage in new forms 
of techno-sociability that defy the power of the media. Becoming cyborgs, we also become 
“hackers” or “cyberpunks”.^
On the one hand, and according to Scott Bukatmarm’s review of the major literature 
on the issue of the social impacts of mass commimication and information technologies, the 
dystopian point of view conceives of the society in which we live as a social world in which 
we have lost the sense of the difference between what is real and what is simulation.^ Lideed, 
“what we regard as reality stands revealed as a construction -  a provisional and malleable 
alignment of data” (Terminal Identity 30). The concepts of “spectacle” and “reality” have 
become indistinguishable, because “reality has moved inside an electronic nonspace” (cyber­
space), society has become the mirror of television, and individuals have lost their ability to 
distinguish image from reality, have surrendered themselves to the spectacle, and have 
become addicted to images. Furthermore, the society in which we live looks like a social 
world that only exists as “a proliferation of semiotic systems and simulations which 
increasingly serve to replace physical human experience and interaction.” Simulations have 
become more real, more familiar, more authoritative, and more satisfying than physical reality 
itself “It is the onslaught of images, the bombardment of signals. The pervasive domination 
by, and addiction to, the image” that “might be regarded as a primary symptom of terminal
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identity” (Terminal Identity 26). Therefore, I find that we are ourselves terminal beings, 
plugged in our technological devices of information and un-coirmiunication. Wired-up, 
addicted to information, spectacles and simulacra, we have become “buttonheads”.
On the other hand, the new utopianism proposes that spectacular controls are not' 
unquestionable and alienation is not necessary."* On the contrary, technology has managed to 
provide mankind with a new space -  cyberspace -  in which human beings can escape 
spectacular controls and can expand their human essence. The acceptance of this proposal 
only requires the awareness of the human character of the processes of artificialization of 
nature and virtualization of reality, and the abandonment of traditional conceptions of the 
separation between nature and artifacts, mankind and technology. Becoming netcyborgs, men 
are becoming hackers. They remain human because their relationship with technology is one 
of synergy (rather than one of dependence), in which they socially appropriate and take 
control of technology. Therefore, the new utopianism sees technology as the condition for the 
appearance of a new form of humanity.
In his War o f the Worlds, Mark Slouka sees cyberspace as both a positive and a 
negative technology. He argues that recent computerized technology has provoked a growing 
separation from reality and has destroyed the old world in which we, as a collectivity, had a 
place within an actual local community and a cormection to a particular physical landscape. 
He claims that computerized technology has become the real force behind a general trend 
toward massive abstraction fi'om reality and alienation fi-om the local. He concludes, in short, 
that [1] supersonic speed, if not in transportation, at least in corrmiunication, divorces us from 
the real landscape and commimity in which we live, and [2] that computers induce
*
hallucination and create a strange nonplace beyond the computer screen in which people are 
increasingly preferring to live, to choose their peers, and to establish their relationships. The 
name of this nonplace is Cyberspace.
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Slouka, however, also claims that cyberspace promotes an escape jfrom the traditional 
limitations of the human life: space and time. Freeing human beings from their physical 
circumstances, cyberspace has also liberated humans from their bodies and has made them "to 
value quickness of mind over beauty, wit over physical power, the content of our characters 
over the color of our skin". Thus, in his view, cyberspace has freed individuals from the 
obligation of presenting the appearance of a unified personality, which is required by the 
primary commimity of local neighborhood, and has allowed them to play different identities, 
blurring the boundaries "between self and other, between the imagined world and the sensual 
one, between reality and illusion". Furthermore, Slouka emphatically proposes that 
cyberspace has also blurred the traditional boundary between animal and mechanical qualities 
by connecting the human nervous system to a computer and has transformed the proper 
computer user into a cyborg: half man, half computer, the unbreakable synthesis of the man 
and machine.
What kind of relationship between mankind and the technologies of the spectacle of 
late Twentieth Century is portrayed in the Wachowski Brothers’ film The Matrix? What kind 
of cyborgs are we: buttonheads or cyberpunks? Proesthetics, interpretive, or net-cyborgs? 
These are the crucial questions I will be dealing with in this chapter.
n
The Matrix was written and directed by Andy and Larry Wachowski (who have 
previously been writers of the Marvel Comics) and produced by Joel Silver (producer of The 
Lethal Weapon and Die Hard series) for the Warner Brothers Studios, It was shot in Sidney, 
Australia; released on April 2“^ , 1999 in the United States and then worldwide. It became a 
blockbuster, earning more than one hundred million in the U.S. market alone and receiving 
dozens of awards for its special effects. Since then, Warner Brothers Studios keeps an official 
web site of the film, which contains behind the scenes information, information on cast and
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crew, interviews with cast and crew, a photo gallery and trailers of the film, a chat archive, a 
list of the awards the movie has received, information on the studio, samples of the 
storyboards, and a gateway for comic books sale and computer games.^ Other imofBcial sites 
bring information and critical reviews of the film.^
The official web site describes the plot of the film as follow:
What if reality was false and your nightmares were true? Is the present the past and the 
fijture happening now? Thomas Anderson begins suspecting these questions. 
Anderson is a young man trying to live his life in the hustle and bustle of your typical 
modern-day metropolitan city. He has good fiiends, a loving family and ambitions to 
succeed in his job - working. for the multi-national computer company 
'METACORTECHS'. But lately he has been plagued by a nightmare, a horrific dream 
of himself being physically wired agauist his will into a vast fiituristic computer 
system -  and every night he wakes up screaming at the point the electrodes pierce into 
his brain. As the dreams continue, his life suddenly begins taking a strange turn -  most 
surrounding a leather clad woman whom seems to be determined to find something in 
the corporation. Anderson now begins having doubts about reality. Is he really here in 
a present day city, or is he wired up with millions of others into the massive 'Matrix' in 
the fiiture -  all blissfiilly unaware of where they really are? If the latter is true then 
how and why is he there? Who is he really? Is everyone else around him trapped like 
he is, or are they just computer projections? And most important of all -  Who put him 
there and what will they do if they realize he suspects the truth? 
flittp://www. whatisthematrix.wamerbros.com)
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This description is somewhat inaccurate. First, it reduces Neo to Thomas Anderson. 
The Matrix's hero is not portrayed in the film as a technocratic employee; he is also a hacker. 
Secondly, it reduces Neo’s adventures in the real world to Thomas Anderson’s nightmares. 
By converting Neo into Thomas Anderson, this summary takes the reality experienced by 
Thomas as real and sees the reality experienced by Neo as merely Thomas Anderson’s 
nightmare and/or delusion. In establishing this discontinuity between reality and fiction, the 
summary occludes what the film has of most intriguing, as well as the references it proposes 
in regard to our society and way of life. It reinforces the principles, values, beliefs and utopia 
on which rests the Westem technological creed. To conceive and to present Neo’s world -  a 
world in which machines seized control of mankind by inducing a collectively shared illusion,
thus putting it to work in behalf of their own agenda -  as a deliisional or ni^tmarish element 
of Thomas Anderson’s world essentially means to dismiss the significance of this world.
*
Inaccurate as it is, this ofBcial description of the plot of The Matrix is neither arbitrary 
nor absurd. The experiment in reader-response criticism I conducted with my students is 
relevant in this context. Their response to the film is congruent with the Warner Brothers 
Studios’ description of its plot. Thus, before considering the reasons that led me evaluate this 
description as inaccurate, I will briefly consider the results of this experiment.
Thirty-one undergraduate students participated in this experiment. We watched the 
film together and debated how it defines three relationships; (1) the relationship between 
reality and virtual spectacles in the film, (2) the relationship between the fictional world of the 
narrative and our real world, and (3) the relationship between human beings and machines. 
Initially, my students diverged in regard to the relationship between reality and virtual 
spectacles and the borderline that separates them. Most of them consider the interior set of 
the Nebuchadnezzar (Morpheus’ hovercraft), the gutters in which it navigates, and the power 
plant in which himian beings are wired up as being the real world of the film, the matrix being 
the virtual one. Nevertheless, a representative number of my students (8 out of 31) answered 
that the real world could only be the city in which human beings have hairs instead of holes in 
their skulls. In their view, to see as reality the gutters in which the few human beings find 
refiige and the power plants in which the multitude of human beings remain alienated, as 
power sources for working of the machines, is unthinkable. One could perhaps see this 
perception as ideologically conservative; to be human is to walk in flesh and blood on city 
streets, whereas to be a cyborg is to be a machine.
Besides, there was also some discrepancy in their views of the relationship between 
the fictional world of the narrative and our real world. Most of the students agreed with the 
view of the matrix portrayed by the ofBcial description of the film’s plot. They saw the
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narrative as delusional -  a kind of dream or a fiction with no links with reality. They thought 
this fiction was a hypothesis quite impossible in both the present and the near fixture. They 
justified this evaluation in terms of the unreality of the conception of machines that think 
independently, seize control of the world and dominate mankind. They argued that in spite of 
all recent advances in digital technology and artificial intelligence, machines would always be 
limited and vulnerable to the intervention of the men who programmed them. They rejected 
the notion of a self-sufficient machine and, principally, the conception of a spectacle which is 
so overwhelmingly persuasive and powerfiil that it is able to make every human being to 
share its illusions as well and to dream, see, perceive and feel the virtual as actual. A few of 
them (2 out of 31) established a relationship between the narrative and the reality we 
experience, making references to addiction to the web, its illusions and virtual realities, which 
causes the rupture of primary social relations. Only one of my students, however, considered 
that the narrative of the film was closely related to our reality, which he defined in terms of “a 
system that controls the multitude through an infinity of illusions.” Once again, here, human 
reality tends to involve a resistance to the machine and the cyborg and an affirmation of the 
centrality of the idea that man is separate fi-om, and in control of, his creations.
They were, however, almost imanimous in seeing machines as instruments of progress 
and development, tools that cooperate to the welfare of mankind. They radically rejected the 
possibility of machines coming to seize control and asserted man’s control over technology. 
Only a few (3 out of 31) pointed to some degree of competition between mankind and 
machines, by referring to the reduction of job openings in consequence of automation.
Thus, the reading most of my students made of The Matrix -  as well as the official 
description of the film’s plot by the Warner Brothers Studios -  is shaped by the utopian 
principles and values of the Westem technological creed. Machines are instruments of 
progress, they are usefiil and controlled by men; indeed, they are usefiil because they are
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controlled by men. Only in fiction it is possible to see machines dominating men. Both the 
official description of the film and the prevailing reading among my students -  all of them 
deeply involved with digital technologies -  reveal the overwhelming power that the Westem 
technological creed still holds in our society. They also reveal that the meanings of The 
Matrix are reduced and tamed by the predominance of this creed, its principles and values. 
When the narrative challenges the beliefs most deeply shared by its audience, it is rejected as 
delusional.
m
In their reliance on the utopian principles of the Westem technological creed, my 
students tend to miss crucial aspects of the film. These can be best perceived when one 
distinguishes three phases within the narrative of The Matrix. The first involves the insistence 
on the delusional character of both Anderson’s world and, by analogy, our world. This real 
world is contained by the spectacular reality generated by the matrix and, in it, spectators 
remain, as the film’s hero, unaware of what the matrix is. Furthermore, as the spectacular 
reality generated by the matrix is quite similar to the world in which the spectators live, they 
take it as the true reality. This phase goes from the beginning of the film until the moment 
when Morpheus offers Neo the red and the blue pills. The second phase starts when Neo 
takes the red pill and ends when the Agents capture Morpheus. It is a tutorial stage in the 
strict sense of the term. During this tutorial, the spectators follow Neo’s learning of what the 
matrix and the real world actually are. It is a tutorial on the spectacular nature of both the 
matrix and of Neo’s fate. While Neo leams how to breathe and to walk, to jimip and to fight 
within the spectacular reality, we (the spectators) leam about the spectacle. The final phase of 
the narrative is proactive. It starts when Neo decides to save Morpheios’s life and makes 
possible his destiny as the Chosen One, Morpheus’s destiny as the believer. Trinity’s destiny 
as a woman, and mankind’s destiny as the controller of machines and the master of the world.
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It is a tutorial in the sense of rendering Neo the paradigmatic model of how we shall behave 
within the society of the spectacle to recover our freedom and will.
The first two stages of the narrative are concerned with the description of the 
spectacular society of the future in which Thomas Anderson lives as an interpretive cyborg (in 
Lemos’s definition of the concept), but also as a hacker. During the first stage of the 
narrative, this future world is quite similar to our present, so we can identify his world with 
our society. During the second stage, his reality becomes the opposite of ours; it becomes 
something we can only imagine insofar as he gains -  as a prosthetics cyborg -  control over 
cyberspace. The last stage of the narrative is concerned with the behavior that makes Neo a 
hero and a net-cyborg. How can this plot be less reassuring of the Westem technological 
creed and utopia when we consider that, at the end, mankind finally regains control of the 
high-developed machines that created the Matrix -  that is to say, the spectacle?
It can be less reassuring of tecno-utopianism precisely because it reveals the power of 
technology as instrumental in the constitution of human beings. Thus, in its description of the 
world of the future/our contemporary society. The Matrix metaphorically reproduces both the 
utopian and the dystopian views of the society of the spectacle that has been proposed by 
critical theory. On the one hand, the references to Marshall McLuhan’s utopian view of 
technology as an extension of man, media culture as a natural and evolutionary stage in 
human development, mechanical technologies as a means to ease the stress on the body, and 
electronic technologies as extensions of the central nervous system that further empower the 
human brains are quite explicit in the training of Neo to face the Agents of the matrix. 
Technological reality is, in a sense, more real than “natural” reality. “What is real?”
♦
Morpheus asks, “How do you define real? If you're talking about your senses, what you feel, 
taste, smell, or see, then all you’re talking about are electrical signals interpreted by your 
brain” {The Matrix).
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On the other hand, the fihn portrays the world in which Thomas Anderson lives as a
simulacrum, in which people collectively believe and act according to a delusional and
overwhelmingly persuasive representation imposed by the power of the spectacle. Inhabitants
of this world are buttonheads who remain unaware of reality and alienated. It is, to a certain
extent, the world inhabited by most of my students. Inhabitants of this world take for granted
what is only a representation constructed for the purpose of dominating human beings. The
film’s imagery draws heavily on Debord’s and Baudrillard’s theories.’ This imagery is
particularly significant in the episode in which Neo and Morpheus finally meet and Neo takes
the red pill that opens the road to reality:
MORPHEUS -  Do you believe in fate, Neo?
N EO -N o.
MORPHEUS -  Why not?
NEO -  Because I don't like the idea that Tm not in control of my life.
MORPHEUS -  I know exactly what you mean... Let me tell you why you are here. 
You are here because you have the gift.
NEO -  What gift?
MORPHEUS -  I've watched you, Neo. You do not lise a computer like a tool. You 
use it like it was part of yourself. What you can do inside a computer is not normal. I 
know, Tve seen it. What you do is magic.
NEO -  It's not magic.
MORPHEUS -  But it is, Neo. It is. How else would you describe what has been 
happening to you?
MORPHEUS -  We are trained in this world to accept only what is rational and logical. 
Have you ever wondered why?
[Neo shakes his head.]
MORPHEUS -  As children, we do not separate the possible from the impossible 
which is why the younger mind is the easier to free while a mind like yours can be 
very difficult.
NEO -  Free from what?
MORPHEUS -  From the Matrix. Do you want to know what it is, Neo?
[Neo swallows and nods his head.]
MORPHEUS -  It's that feeling you have had all your life. That feeling that something 
was wrong with the world. You don't know what it is but it's there, like a splinter m 
your mind, driving you mad, driving you to me. But what is it? The Matrix is 
everywhere, it's all aroimd us, here even in this room. You can see it out your 
window, or on your television. You feel it when you go to work, or go to church or 
pay your taxes. It is the world that has been pulled over your eyes to blind you from 
the truth.
NEO -  What truth?
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MORPHEUS - That you are a slave, Neo. That you, like everyone else, was bom into 
bondage... kept inside a prison that you cannot smell, taste, or touch. A prison for 
your mind (The Matrix).
The matrix is, therefore, a prison that simulates freedom. It is quintessentially a spectacle.
Significantly, to tell him the recent history of the world, Morpheus turns on a television set:
[He picks up a remote control and clicks on the television. We drift through the 
Windy City circa 1996.]
MORPHEUS -  This is the Chicago you know. Chicago as it was at the end of the 
twentieth century. This Chicago exists only as part of a neural-interactive simulation 
that we call the Matrix. [We glide at the television as he changes the charmel.] You 
have been living inside Baudrilaurd's vision, inside the map, not the territory. This is 
Chicago as it exists today. [The sky is an endless sea of black and green bile. The 
earth, scorched and split like burnt flesh, spreads out beneath us as we enter tiie 
television.] The desert of the real. [In the distance, we see the ruins of a fiiture 
Chicago protruding from the wasteland like the blackened ribs of a long-dead corpse.] 
We are, right now, miles below the earth's surface. The only place humans can 
survive outside the Matrix is underground.
NEO -  What happened?
MORPHEUS -  It started early in the twenty-first century, with the birth of artificial 
intelligence, a singular consciousness that spawned an entire race of machines. [In his 
sunglasses, we see storm clouds gather.] At first all they wanted was to be treated as 
equals, entitled to the same human inalienable rights. Whatever they were given, it 
was not enough. [In the circular window of the glasses, EXPLOSIONS light up a 
bloody battle field.] We don't know who struck first. Us or them. But sometime at 
the end of the twenty-first century the battle was joined. [We MOVE INTO his 
glasses and the war surrounds us.] The war raged for generations and turned the face 
of our planet from green and blue to black and red. It scorched and burned the sky. 
Without the sun, the machines sought out a new energy source to survive. They 
discovered a new form of fiision. All that was required to initiate the reaction was a 
small electric charge. Throughout human history we have been dependent on 
machines to survive. Fate, it seems, is not without a sense of irony. [We retum to the 
power plant that Neo escaped from where we see human beings looking almost 
blissfiil in their gelatin cocoons.] The human body generates more bio-electricity than 
a 120-volt battery and over 25,000 B.T.U.’s of body heat. [Outside, spreading all 
around the power plant, beneath a breathing greenhouse, are the growing fields.] We 
are, as an energy source, easily renewable and completely recyclable, the dead 
liquified and fed intravenously to the living. [Huge farm-like reapers are harvesting 
the crop.] All they needed to control this new battery was something to occupy our 
mind. [We see inside a clear tubular husk. Floating in viscous fluid, there is a human 
fetus; its soft skull already growing around the brain-jack.] And so they built a prison 
out of our past, wired it to our brains and tumed us into slaves. [We PULL BACK to 
find the image is now on the television and we are again inside the white space of the 
Constract.]
NEO-No! I don't believe it! It's not possible!
MORPHEUS - 1 didn't say that it would be easy, Neo, I just said that it would be the 
tmth (The Matrix).
85
The same imagery of a world dominated by the machines is once again presented when Agent
Smith tutors Morpheus on the history of the matrix:
AGENT SMITH - Have you ever stood and stared at it, Morpheus? Marveled at its 
beauty. Its genius. Billions of people just living out their lives... oblivious. [...] Did 
you know that the first Matrix was designed to be a perfect human world? Where 
none suffered, where everyone would be happy. It was a disaster. No one would 
accept the program. Entire crops were lost. Some believed we lacked the 
prograrmning language to describe your perfect world. But I believe that, as a species, 
human beings define their reality through suffering and misery. The perfect world was 
a dream that your primitive cerebrum kept trying to wake up from. Which is why the 
Matrix was re-designed to this: the peak of your civilization. {The Matrix)
Thus, The Matrix repeatedly portrays the world of Thomas Anderson as a simulacrum and, in
doing so, the film endorses the criticisms that have been addressed to the society of the
spectacle, and reveals the ways it works and how it serves to reinforce the structures of power
and oppression through persuasive means of alienation. Endorsing the criticisms towards the
prevailing strategy (in Certeau’s sense of the concept). The Matrix is a narrative endowed
with tactical elements. It denounces the spectacular nature of our society; it intends a rebuttal
to the non-communication process that the means of communication at service of spectacles
and simulacra create. Those tactical elements are lost in both the readings of my students and
the Warner Brothers Studios’ official description of the film’s plot, but these tactical elements
are crucial for the comprehension of The Matrix in the context of the Westem Technological
creed.
*
The Matrix does not portray its central character as a well-adapted and self-realized 
bureaucratic worker at a computer company, or a happy young man cared by his loving 
family and enjoying his good fiiends. There is no mention to his family and the film 
essentially presents Thomas Anderson as a lonely hacker. He knows and admires the 
victories that other hackers have reached, so he recognizes Trinity, in their first encounter, as 
the hacker who “cracked the I.R.S. Kansas City D-Base.” He lives secluded in a small room
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full of computer devices, sells unauthorized software as a drug dealer, and spends long
evening hours in front of his personal computer trying to figure what is the matrix. Indeed, hee
works at *p 4Xa computer company (which has the suggestive name of METACORTEX), but he is
often late to work and his superior describes him as having a behavioral problem.* Thus, the
ultimate company man, Rhineheart, lectures Thomas Anderson after another late arrival, the
day after he met Trinity:
You have a problem with authority, Mr. Anderson. You think that you're special.
You believe that somehow the rules do not apply to you. Obviously, you are 
mistaken. This company is one of the top software companies in the world because 
every single employee imderstands that they are a part of a whole. Thus, if an 
employee has a problem, the company has a problem. The time has come to make a 
choice, Mr. Anderson. Either you choose to be at your desk on time or you choose to 
find yourself another job. Do I make myself clear?
His first contact with the Agents, after he was arrested at METACORTEX’s office,
renders totally clear this dual dimension of Thomas Anderson’s life. Agent Smith brings to
their interview a file in which the Agency keeps track of all activities Mr. Anderson has
accomplished as the hacker called Neo, and which he will use trying to coerce Neo to
cooperate for the capture of Morpheus. Reinforcing the issue of the ambivalence of
Anderson-Neo’s identity, he says:
As you can see, we have our eyes on you for some time now, Mr. Anderson. It seems 
that you have been living two lives. In one life, you are Thomas A. Anderson, 
program writer for a respectable software company. You have a social security 
number, you pay your taxes and you help your landlady carry out her garbage. The 
other life is lived within computers where you go by the hacker alias Neo and are 
guilty of virtually every computer crime we have a law for. One of these lives has a 
future. One of them does not {The Matrix).
This ambiguity in the identity of the central hero will be preserved throughout the 
narrative and will serve to distinguish the two worlds in which the hero lives his adventure.
So, Morpheus and his crew will never address the hero by his name, but only as Neo. It will 
reach its climatic expression and find its final solution when Neo and Agent Smith, who 
stubbornly calls him Mr. Anderson, fight in the El Station, by the end of the narrative:
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[Agent Smith grabs hold of him, lifting him into the air, hurling him against the curved 
wall of the train tunnel, where he falls inches fi-om the electrified third-rail. The Agent 
is about to jump down, and press his attack when he hears something. From deep in 
the tuimel, like an animal cry; a burst of high-speed metal grinding against metal. The 
sovmd of an on-coming train. Neo tries to get up. Agent Smith jumps down onto the 
tracks and drop kicks him in the face. The world begins to shake, rumbling as the 
train nears.]
AGENT SMITH -  Do you hear that, M r. Anderson?
[Agent Smith grabs Neo in a choke-hold, forcing him to look down the tracks, the 
train's headlight burning a hole in the darkness.]
AGENT SMI TH -  That is the sound of inevitability.
[Neo sees it coining and he starts to fight.]
AGENT SMITH -  It is the sound of your death.
[There is another metal screech, much louder, closer, as Agent Smith tightens his hold. 
Neo is vinable to breathe.]
AGENT SMITH -  Goodbye, Mr. Anderson.
[The train roars at them, swallowing Agent Smith's words. The veins bulge in Neo's 
head, as he grits through the pain. He is not ready to die.]
NEO -  My name is Neo.
[Impossibly, he hurls himself straight up, smashing Smith against the concrete ceiling 
of the tunnel. They fall as the sound and fiiry of the train explodes into the station. 
Neo back-fiips up off the tracks just as the train barrels over Agent Smith. Neo stands, 
knees shaking, when the train slams on its emergency brake. With an ear-splitting 
shriek of tortured rails, the train slows, part of it still in the station. Neo turns, 
limping, starting to run, racing for the escalator. As the train comes to a stop and the 
doors of the last car open, Agent Smith bursts out in furious pursuit, his glasses again 
intact] {The Matrix).
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The whole narrative of The Matrix can be reduced to this transition from Anderson to 
Neo’s identity, from interpretive cyborg to net-cyborg, that is completed when Neo insists on 
his identity as Neo rather than as Thomas Anderson. This is also the moment when he 
definitely defeats Agent Smith. The opposite route is taken by the narrative’s more 
despicable villain -  Cypher, who knows the truth, but prefers alienation, who became a 
netcyborg, but chooses to be a interpretive cyborg (a buttonhead) again, and betrays the 
human race.^ . Clearly the film’s hero is not the self-realized bureaucratic worker at a 
computer company. On the contrary, his identity is not so easily defined. It is full of 
ambiguities and, in its ambiguity, reflects the connections between the paradoxical worlds in 
which he lives.’°
On the one hand, he is, indeed, Thomas Anderson. Anderson is a strategic identity. It 
is the authorized identity the hero has within the matrix. It is the identity provided by the 
matrix, reliable, but alienating. It is socially acceptable, but individually unfiilfilling. It is the 
identity suited for daily and public places. It is who he thinks he is, but who he vaguely feels 
he is not and intensely dreams he is not. On the other hand, Neo is an imauthorized identity; 
itis risky and kept in secret; it is assumed at night, it is lived in the undergroxuid, and it is only 
known by a handful of costumers and Morpheus’s crew. This, however, is finally his true 
identity.
Insofar as The Matrix privileges Neo’s rather than Anderson’s identity, it is a 
challenge to our well-established sense of reality. Instead of presenting the matrix as being 
merely Thomas Anderson’s delusion, the narrative of The Matrix makes it real -  fantastically 
and unbelievably real, but still real -  and, in consequence, makes us wonder about the place 
and role of mankind in a future and a society heavily dependent upon technology. It makes us 
question the utopian character of the Westem technological creed, and makes us wonder if 
this fantastic future it describes is not already present. The film becomes, then, less 
reassuring of the Westem technological creed, which usually favors a view that separates men 
from machines.
IV
Most of the narrative of The Matrix is tiie narrative of its hero’s search of who he is. 
This quest for the hero’s identity is inseparable from the process of learning in which the 
audience follows the path of the film’s hero. At the beginning, like Thomas Anderson, the 
audience is unaware of the spectacular nature of reality, and, of the way control and power are 
exercised on people by the pervasive presence of the spectacles that render them alienated 
from reality. Like Thomas Anderson, the viewers remain wired up and unaware of the power 
of the spectacle. The virtual becomes part of reality and, as buttonheads, audience and
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Anderson live a delusional dream. Later, those characters who have already been freed from 
spectacles and simulacra make contact with Neo. He is implugged and awakes to a 
nightmarish reality, to which he drags the audience and through which he reveals, by the 
power of analogy, how we (the spectators) have been kept under confrol, alienated and 
exploited -  the hero by spectacles that serve machines, we by spectacles that serve power. 
Having known reality, Neo leams that the fiiture of mankind requires the struggle against the 
spectacle and the machines that control it. He leams, but he does not believe that he is the 
Chosen One: the man who could regain control upon the matrix, change it, free mankind from 
the control exercised by machines. He ultimately responds to the wishes of the three major 
characters of the narrative: Morpheus, who believes that Neo is the Chosen One; Trinity, 
whose destiny would be to fall in love with the Chosen One; and his own destiny to die within 
the matrix and to resurrect as a human being who would gain control over the matrix. We are 
plugged to him throughout this period of learning.
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Throughout the whole narrative, Neo’s search for his real identity is portrayed through 
a rhetorical resource: the multiple choices he has to make with regard to his life, fiiture, and 
self. He always has to choose his path between alternatives that are presented to him. Thus, 
in the first phase of the narrative, Rinheheart gives Thomas Anderson the altemative of 
complying with METACORTEX’s rules or find another job. Agent Smith gives him the 
rhetorical altemative of having a fiiture -  by abandoning Neo’s activities as well as by helping 
him to capture Morpheus -  or having none. And his fia'st contacts with Morpheus and other 
members of his crew also involve his need to make a choice. Prior to his capture by the 
Agents within the METACORTEX building, Morpheus guides him through an escape route. 
Afraid to fall, Anderson refiises to go outside the window and to climb the scaffold to the top 
of the building. As Morpheus explams, “there is only two ways out of this building. One is
that scaffold. The other is in their custody. You take a chance either way. I leave it to you”
{The Matrix). After he was taken in custody by the Agents and released, when Trinity, Apoc
and Switch take him to meet Morpheus, they give him another choice:
SWITCH - Right now there is only one rule: our way or the highway.
[Anderson hesitates, but decides to leave the car.]
ANDERSON-Fine...
[Trinity interferes.]
TRINITY -  Please Neo, you have to trust me.
ANDERSON-Why?
TRINITY -  Because you have been down there, Neo. You know that way. You 
know exactly where it ends. And I know that it is not where you want to be.
[Neo closes the door and the automobiles run away] {The Matrix).
This rhetorical resource is used twice again, later in the narrative. It serves as an
introduction to each one of the other phases I have distinguished within the plot. First, by
opening the tutorial phase of the narrative, Morpheus gives Anderson the choice of taking the
red or the blue pill:
MORPHEUS -  Unfortunately, no one can be told what the Matrix is. You have to see 
it for yourself.
NEO -  How?
MORPHEUS -  Hold out your hands. [In Neo's right hand, Morpheus drops a red pill. 
In his left, a blue pill.] This is your last chance. After this, there is no going back. You 
take the blue pill and the story ends. You wake in your bed and you believe whatever 
you want to believe. You take the red pill and you stay in Wonderland and I show you 
how deep the rabbit-hole goes. Remember that all I am offering is the truth. Nothing 
more {The Matrix).
Later, opening the proactive phase of the narrative and closing one of the central
sequences of the film, the Oracle gives Neo the choice of saving Morpheus’s life or his own -
i.e., the choice of behaving or not as the Chosen One, which is also the choice of accepting or
denying his fate:
ORACLE -  And don’t worry about the vase.
NEO -  What vase?
[He turns and pushes the vase, which falls down and brakes.]
ORACLE -  That vase.
NEO [collecting the pieces of the vase] -  I’m sorry.
ORACLE - 1 Said, don’t worry about it. I get one of my kids to fix it.
NEO -  How did you know?
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ORACLE -  Oh... What really going to bum your brain later on is would you still have 
broken it if I didn’t say anything?... You are guilter than I thought. I see why she 
likes you.
NEO-W ho?
ORACLE -  But not too But not too why Morpheus brought you to see me?...
So, what do you think? Do you think you are the One?
NEO -  Honestly, I don’t know.
ORACLE [pointing out a sign in the wall above Neo’s head] -  Do you know what that 
means?... Latin! Means: know thyself... I will let you know a secret. BemgtheOne 
is just like being in love. None can tell you are in love. You just know it, without 
doubts... Well, better I have a look at you. Open your mouth, say ah!
[Neo says “ah” and the Oracle look at his mouth and, then, at his hands.]
ORACLE -  Okay! Time to say: “Humm!!! That is interesting, but...” And you say? 
NEO -  But, what?
ORACLE -  But you already know what I am going to tell you...
NEO - 1 am not the One.
ORACLE -  Sorry, kid. You got the gift, but it looks like you are waiting something... 
NEO-W hat?
ORACLE -  Yo\ir next life, maybe? Who knows? That is the way these things go.
[Neo smiles and the Oracle asks:]
ORACLE -  What is fiinny?
NEO -  Morpheus... He ahnost has me convinced.
ORACLE - 1 know... Poor Morpheus. Without him we are lost.
NEO [surprised] -  What you mean... without him?
ORACLE -  Are you sure you want to hear this?... Morpheus believes in you, Neo. 
And none, not you, not even me, can convince him otherwise. He believes so blindly 
that he is going to sacrifice his life to save yours.
NEO [astonished] -  What???
ORACLE -  You are going to have to make a choice. In the one hand, you will have 
Morpheus’s life. And, in the other hand, you will have yours. One of you will have to 
die. Which one will be up to you.., I am sorry, kid. I am really sorry. You have a 
good soul and I hate to give good people, bad news... No... Don’t you worry about 
it... You just step outside that door and you will start feeling better. You will 
remember you do not believe on this fate crap... You are in control of your own life. 
Remember.,, Here, take a cookie, I promise you: by the time you have done eating it, 
you will feel just right {The Matrix).
Neo’s choices are always related to his identity; they allow him to evolve from who he 
thinks he is to who he actually is. Like Frankenstein, The Matrix is pervaded by transitions. 
Throughout the narrative, the hero asks again and again about his identity. His answer always 
involves a degree of disbelief. As in the case of Frankenstein's Monster, Neo’s search for his 
identity initially reveals the unpleasant circumstances of his condition. Rather than being a 
free human being in control of his own life, he discovers himself being enslaved by the 
matrix; he is the victim of the “prison he carmot see, feel or taste”, which reduces him to a
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battery that feeds the machines that had taken over the world. His world, his memories, his 
body, himself, his utopia of a mankind being in control of the technology it uses, everything 
he always took for granted prove to be an illusion. He is none; his world is dystopian. As in 
the case of the Monster, Neo’s search ends with a terrifying revelation: the nightmarish truth 
related to his condition.
Unlike Frankenstein's Monster, however, Neo is not abandoned in his misery. On the 
contrary, he is freed and he is provided with a new utopian identity -  indeed, so utopian that 
he cannot believe it: the identity of being the Chosen One with the mission of recovering the 
human utopia of controlling the world and the artifacts men create. Furthermore, after giving 
him freedom (and the images employed -  the naked and bald Neo immersed in a womblike 
cradle - comprise the meaning of a new birth), Morpheus and Trinity stand by his side and try 
to bring him some relief" They give him support and they believe him. Suggestively, the 
narrative ends when the hero assumes his unauthorized identity and converts his disbelief in 
faith. Thus, like the characters of Frankenstein, the hero of The Matrix also undergoes a 
transition. His travel, however, drives him towards who he actually is and to his humanity. 
He starts being Thomas Anderson -  the buttonhead or interpretive cyborg who has a double 
life as a hacker -  and ends being Neo -  the paradigmatic netcyborg that everyone, living in a 
society of spectacles and simulacra, must become to remain human and to retain control of the 
technology that has subdued mankind. Reality, thus, replaces virtuality, awareness replaces 
alienation, freedom and will replace a simulacrum of freedom and will. This transition occurs 
through a process of re-enchantment of the secularized world and, thus, the skeptical 
Anderson at the beginning or his joumey, because he cannot stand the idea of not being in 
control of his own life, becomes the Neo who achieves control of his own life precisely 
because he fulfills his fate.
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Identity is, thus, a major issue in The Matrix. How identity is buih and defined is also
crucial for understanding the story. The questions of identity involves coming to grips with
reality and illusion, faith and will, body and memory, senses and feelings. Lets go back to the
episode in which Agent Smith questions Anderson. After describing the double life Anderson
has lived and stating that only the life of the well-adapted bureaucratic officer at
METACORTEX has a future. Agent Smith tries to cut a deal with Anderson:
Fm going to be as forthcoming as I can be, Mr. Anderson. You are here because we 
need your help. We know that you have been contacted by a certain individual -  a 
man who calls himself Morpheus. Whatever you think you know about this man is 
irrelevant to the fact that he is wanted for acts of terrorism in more countries than any 
other man in the world. He is considered by many authorities to be the most 
dangerous man alive. My colleagues believe that I am wasting my time with you, but 
I believe you want to do the right thing. It is obvious that you are an intelligent man, 
Mr. Anderson, and that you are interested in the future. That is why I believe you are 
ready to put your past mistakes behind you and get on with your life. We are willing 
to wipe the slate clean, to give you a fresh start and all we are asking in return is your 
cooperation in bringing a known terrorist to justice (The Matrix).
Neo refuses to comply and Agent Smith states: “You disappoint me, Mr. Anderson. The
irony of your situation is that you have no choice.” Neo is, however, confident in the liberal
creed of the democratic rights, which are protected by the Constitution -  “You can't scare me
with this Gestapo crap. I know my rights. I want my phone call.” Smith replies with a
glimpse of crude power: “And tell me, Mr. Anderson, what good is a phone call if you are
unable to speak?” He makes Anderson’s lips melt, his mouth disappears, his confusion grows
into panic. The Agents rip open Anderson’s shirt and Smith takes fi'om a case a fiber-optic
wiretap that becomes an organic creature, which probes into Anderson’s navel and worms its
way inside his abdomen.
In the next scene, Anderson awakes as if the interrogatory and the electronic worm
were pieces of a nightmare. At this stage of the narrative, the sense of reality is totally a
function of body sensations: Anderson awakes as he is having a nightmare, his mouth has
lips, teeth and tongue, his navel has no scars, he breathes easily. This sequence represents the
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only moment in which the narrative of the film makes an association between the 
unbelievable reality it describes and Anderson’s nightmares. This is a moment in the 
narrative in which the conception of reality as delusional serves to keep imchallenged the 
delusional reality generated by the spectacular matrix (it veils the actions of its Agents and 
hides the way they subdue Anderson to get what they want from him). The power of the 
matrix here has no regard for freedom, civil rights, independence of will. Anderson is 
coerced to obey a will is not his own. Therefore, the only moment in which The Matrix 
portrays Neo’s reality as Anderson’s nightmare corresponds to the moment in which such 
confiosion between reality and delusion has a purpose within the strategy of power that the 
narrative denounces and its hero challenges. The Matrix intends to make us aware that among 
the strategies available to power and society in their attempts to control individuals, we fmd 
the tools of rendering reality delusional and making delusion real.
Lideed, until this moment, the narrative does not provide many clues -  besides 
Trinity’s unnatural athletic abilities to flee from the police’s pursuit -  with regard to what is 
real and what is delusion. This ambiguity is maintained imtil Neo takes the red pill that 
Morpheus offers him. Until then, reality and delusion will remain mixed up and Anderson’s 
body will be the center of this delusion. Thus, when Trinity, Switch and Apoc extract the 
electronic worm from his abdomen, they treat his body as a real body rather than as an image 
of the body created by the matrix. At this moment, it is the reality of Neo’s body that gives 
Anderson the sense that the interrogatory actually happened; “Jesus Christ, it is real!” 
Anderson says when Trinity extracts the electronic worm from his abdomen. The episode of 
the surgery suggests that the spectacular world generated by the matrix is a real world in
♦
which people move, breathe, sense, and have a body that can be the object of direct and 
material interventions.
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It is the trip provoked by the red pill that undermines the idea of the matrix as reality. 
It reveals a new image of Neo’s body as well as of his identity. From now his physical body 
will become the memory of a body that the matrix had generated equipped with memories, 
sensations, that have also been produced by the matrix. But, while memories might be 
perceived as delusional, the body maintains a degree of reality. Although his real body has no 
hair, his atrophied muscles have to be rebuilt, and his skull is plugged to the matrix, it remains 
a kind of anchor to his reality or, at least, a kind oof anchor to hs sense of himself. Although 
he has the body of a prosthetic cyborg, it is still a body. Furthermore, it is his body that, in 
the final combat with Agent Smith, renders possible what the matrix conceived of as 
impossible -  i.e., the destruction of agents. As a symbolical reconstruction of the human, 
Neo’s resurrection acquires more significance insofar as it is propelled by a bodily sensation: 
Trinity’s kiss. The kiss is suggestive of other meanings as well, as it points to the relevance 
of destiny (because her destiny was to be in love with the Chosen One, and, therefore, was a 
requisite of his fate), faith (because their success, the viewers are told time and again, depends 
on their ability to believe), primary social relationships, emotions, and feelings in the 
definition of the human self.
VI
Like Shelley’s Frankenstein, The Matrix is about transition. It represents the 
transition from a state in which machines seize power, control the world, and subdue mankind 
to a state in which mankind recovers power upon machines and the world. This transition is 
dramatized through the path followed by the life of the central character, who goes through a 
complete change of identity (from Thomas Anderson to Neo), and of self-image (from a wired 
up buttonhead to a daring netcyborg). There is also a change in his sense of reality (from the 
belief on the spectacle to the knowledge of the nightmarish reality), and in his attitude in the 
face of fate (from “rational” and arrogant disbelief to emotional and complete acceptance).
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Thus, the final message of The Matrix is actually one of reassurance of the central 
tenet of the Westem technological creed -  the idea of the human need to control technology. 
And yet, in The Matrix, there is also the suggestion that man’s control of technology does not 
necessarily, naturally and unavoidably occurs as the creed claims. Indeed, The Matrix is more 
emphatic than Shelley’s Frankenstein in pointing to the fact that y/e live in a reality in which 
mankind has lost control upon the technologies of the spectacle it has created and has been 
subdued by them.
Finally, unlike Shelley’s novel, the narrative of the film does not represent machines
as necessarily opposed to men. Certainly, machines and technology that go out of control are
represented as dangerous; however, technology is also presented as the human tool to regain
control of machines. Thus, not only Morpheus’s crew keeps a synergic relationship with
them, but the Chosen One is also a prosthetic cyborg. The only two human beings that are
one hundred percent human in the story are precisely the ones who carmot enter the matrix.
Only cyborgs can now control technology. The most relevant point is, therefore, that this
synergy is presented in terms that bring together what the dystopian views of technology
insists to keep apart: the artifact, the natural and the supernatural; technology, humanity and
some kind of supernatural gift that can only be comprehensible in terms of magic. Thus, all
the hackers in the crew of the Nebuchadnezzar (Morpheus, Trinity, Apoc, Switch and
Cypher), the children at the Oracle’s house and the Oracle herself, and, particularly, the
Chosen One are prosthetic cyborgs endowed with some magic powers that make them able to
control and use technology for their advantage. Thus, Morpheus explains to Neo their
meeting in the following terms:
MORPHEUS -  Let me tell you why you are here. You are here because you have the 
gift.
NEO -  What gift?
MORPHEUS -  Tve watched you, Neo. You do not use a computer like a tool. You 
use it like it was part of yourself What you can do inside a computer is not normal. I 
know. Tve seen it. What you do is magic. {The Matrix)
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Furthermore, during Neo’s tutorial. Tank would define him as a machine:
MORPHEUS -  How is he?
[Tank looks at his watch, rubs his eyes.]
TANK -  Ten hours straight. He's a machine.
[Neo's body spasms and relaxes as his eyes open, breath hissing fi'om his Ups. He
looks at Morpheus.]
NEO -  This is incredible. I know Kimg Fu (The Matrix).
Thus, in The Matrix, technological devices are the means through which Neo develops 
and enhances the abilities that allow him to defeat the Agents and to change the matrix. The 
hero is a netcyborg -  he is a human being tiiat keeps human feelings, sensations, freedom and 
will, and, at the same time, is plugged in technological devices that enhance his power. He is 
a netcyborg who redeems the human species because he accomplishes the erasure of the 
distance between man and machine. Nevertheless, he accomplishes it in a very particular 
fashion: he promotes the re-enchantment -  by both his faith in human destiny and his 
recovering of human primary relationships -  of an overwhelmingly secularized, artificial and 
technological world in which humanity has become enslaved to technology, alienated, or 
inhuman.
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NOTES:
* That is to say, beings so addicted to technologies, information and spectacles that 
they lose their control upon them, their self-reliance, their free will and their non-dependency.
 ^ Scott Bukatman argues that, in the 1980s, two techno-myths -  opposed to 
technocratic mythologies of centralized control and referred to a process of de-massification 
of personality -  arose: cyberpunk and hippie-hacker. He explains: “While cyberpunk 
substitutes the ethos of personal control and individual empowerment through the simple 
mastery of the benign interface, cyberpunk enacts the end of controls -  depicting a world 
where technology circulates more or less freely and, where, as is the case in Neuromancer, 
technology has its own agenda” (Terminal Identity, 199). Be this as it may, three myths have 
been reenacted by the scholar’s analysis of the society of the spectacle: the buttonhead or 
addict myth, the hippie-hacker myth, and the cyberpunk myth. These three myths are crucial 
for understanding the Wachowski Brothers’ The Matrix.
 ^I am heavily drawing on Scott Bukatmann (Terminal Identity, chapter I), who centers 
his analysis on the theoretical work of Marshall McLuhan, Guy Debord and Jean Baudrillard.
I am considering the ideas developed by André Lemos as exemplary of this new 
utopianism.
 ^The ofiBcial web site of The Matrix is: http://www.whatisthematrix.wamerbros.com.
® Consider, for example: http://members.nbci.com/ XMCM/matrix code/matrixe.htm.
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’ On the one hand, for Guy Debord, the society of the spectacle is characterized by the 
domination of the image, the bombardment of signals, the onslaught of images. He considers 
that spectacles are substitutes for the world; they define a new mode of phenomenological, 
political and commercial existence in which “life presents itself as an immense accimiulation 
of spectacles” because “everything that was directly lived has moved away into 
representation” {The Society o f the Spectacle, Thesis 1). He conceives of the media as 
instruments of the spectacle. They are unilateral forms of conmiunication that intrudes hvmian 
reality, change human beings, and generate non-communication. He also proposes that the 
metaphor of image addiction is the best way to describe the alienated citizenship from the 
society of the spectacle insofar as it reveals the nexus commodity-addiction-control. In 
Debord’s view, the high technologically developed forms of unilateral communication related 
with the spectacle promote the addiction and the passivity of the audience in face of the 
spectacle and are controlled by the modem State and its extensions (the media) -  which 
exercises spectacular forms of control that work through seduction rather than coercion with 
unprecedented effectiveness {Society o f the Spectacle, Thesis 24). On the other, Baudrillard 
describes social processes that find their best representation on the viral infection (rather than 
image addiction) metaphor. In his view of our society, “all power to act has been transformed 
into the power to appear” or reduced to an act of viewership, which is considered as an act of 
surrender because resistance and response are irrelevant -  insofar as there is no one to respond 
to -  and, principally, because the proper means of resistance and response have become 
spectacular in their forms. As “the world has passed into a pure simulation of itself,” even 
power “has been subsumed by technological forces” and “has itself become a simulation.” He 
argues that high-technologically developed unilateral or one-directional forms of 
communication not only are one-directional and promote the passivity of the audience, but
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they also promote non-communication. He also argues lliat the simulacra are no longer under 
the control of either state or mass media corporations: “the real power now resides in a 
technology that holds humanity in its thrall” (Simulations, 23-26). Thus, reviewing Debord’s 
and Baudrillard’s views of our society, Scott Bukatman states: “the passage from Debord’s 
spectacle to Baudrillard’s simulation is precisely a shift from a state which constructs the 
spectacle, to a spectacle which now constructs the state” (Terminal Identity, 68).
® The name of the company (METACORTECHS or METACORTEX) is suggestive 
insofar as (1) it promotes a phonetic and semantic association between technology and the 
human cortex, (2) it suggests that the company, which defines itself as one of the top software 
companies in the world, is in the business of enhancing himian cortex and its capabilities, and
(3) it suggests that such enhancement is reached through digital technologies.
 ^ [CHAMBER MUSIC and the ambiance of wealth soak the room as we watch a 
serrated knife saw through a thick, gorgeous steak. The meat is so perfect, charred on the 
outside, oozing red juice from the inside, that it could be a dream.]
CYPHER -That's what he said to me nine years ago. The real world. Ha, what a joke.
[We recognize the grating voice, the insidious laugh.]
CYPHER -  You know what real is? Ill tell you what real is.
[A fork stabs the cube of meat and we follow it up to the face of Cypher.
CYPHER -  Real is just another four-letter word.
[He laughs, shoving the steak into his mouth. The restaurant is located on the top floor of a 
Chicago skyscraper where the view is breathtaking and the menu has no prices. Sitting across 
from Cypher is Agent Smith.]
AGENT SMITH -  Do we have a deal, Mr. Reagan?
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[Cypher chews the steak loudly, smacking it between his teeth.]
CYPHER -  Mmm, so, so fucking good.
[Smith watches him shovel another hunk of meat into his mouth.]
CYPHER -  You know, I know that this steak doesn't exist. I know when I put it in my 
mouth, the Matrix is telling my brain that it is juicy and delicious. After nine years, do you 
know what Tve realized?
[Pausing, he examines the meat skewered on his fork. He pops it in, eyes rolling up, savoring 
the tender beef melting in his mouth.]
CYPHER -  Ignorance is bliss.
AGENT SMI TH -  Then we have a deal?
CYPHER - 1 don't want to remember nothing. Nothing! You understand? And I want to 
be rich. Someone important. Like an actor. You can do that, right?
AGENT SMITH -  Whatever you want, Mr. Reagan.
[Cypher takes a deep drink of wine.]
CYPHER -  All right. You get my  body back in a power plant, reinsert me into the 
Matrix and I'll get you what you want.
AGENT SMITH -  Access codes to Zion (The Matrix).
One of the characteristics that Scott Bukatman uses to define the science fiction 
genre is precisely this ability to render strange the familiar and to render familiar what is 
strange (Terminal Identity, 317). In The Matrix such effect is obtained by presenting what is 
like our ordinary daily life as virtuality and what is illusory and absurd as the real world.
’ * After teaching him the history of the real world and briefing him on the war between 
mankind and machines, Morpheus apologizes:
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NEO - 1 can't go back, can I?
MORPHEUS -  No. But if you could, would you really want to?
[Neo isn't sure of that answer. Morpheus continues:]
MORPHEUS -  I feel that I owe you an apology. There is a rule that we do not free a mind 
once it reaches a certain age. It is dangerous. They have trouble letting go. Their mind turns 
against them. Tve seen it happen. I broke the rule because I had to.
[He stares into the darkness, confessing as much to himself as Neo.]
MORPHEUS -  When the Matrix was first built there was a man bom inside that had the 
ability to change what he wanted, to remake the Matrix as he saw fit. It was this man that 
freed the first of us and taught us the secret of the war; control the Matrix and you control the 
fixture... When he died, the Oracle at the temple of Zion prophesied his retxim and envisioned 
an end to the war and freedom for oxir people. That is why there are those of us that have 
spent oxir entire lives searching the Matrix, looking for him... I did what I did, becaxise I 
believe we have been brought here for a reason, Neo. You are here to serve a pxarpose, just as 
I am here to serve mine.
NEO - 1 told you I don't believe in fate.
[Morpheus smiles, leaning towards him.]
MORPHEUS -  But I do. Neo. I do. Get some rest. You're gomg to need it (77je Afoir/x).
CONCLUSION
In his review of the science fiction geru:e, Scott Bukatman (Terminal Identity)
stresses the visceral relationship between this literary genre, the society of the spectacle,
and the emergence of the cyborgs. He shows that the transformation of human
individuals in cyborgs or terminal beings only took place within a society of the
spectacle and proposes that the image addiction and the viral infection metaphors have
been replicated as a major theme of cyber-literatiire. He also argues that the heavy
dependence upon technology that characterizes our contemporary society erased one
distinction traditionally set as defining of humanity; the distinction between man and
machine. Cyborgs, of course, erase the distinction between men and machines. And
Bukatman considers this erasure as another major theme in cyber-literature.
Bukatman also suggests that the strategy of the society of the spectacle has not
remained unchallenged, and science fiction as a genre includes tactics of evasion and
resistance, which are exemplified by sci-fi heroes, who distinguish themselves by their
ability to control image addiction, to master technology, to remain human beings
although living in a cyberspace, a virtual realm, a machine-oriented and machine-made
world. Bukatman explains:
The idea of being literally addicted to technology has real durability in science 
fiction. The advent of these plug-in cyborgs, these techno-addicts who are 
physically wired into the computer system, indicates that human and machine 
have indeed become coextensive, but addiction is presented as neither positive 
nor unavoidable; it is described fiom the seemingly exempt position of the 
nonaddict. For these writers, and perhaps for much of the discourse on addiction 
as well, the addict is constructed as the opposite of the subject. The subject is 
defined through a mythos of self-reliance, fi-ee will, and nondependency. [...]
To merge with data, then, is acceptable only as long as the subject remains the 
locus of control. While the subject is thus defined as a willed and (relatively)
autonomous force, the addict (as elad, buttonhead, wirehead, or “persona bum”) 
is portrayed as radically de-centered -  passively buffeted by the data rather than 
remaining proudly (if only partially) resistant to its lures (Terminal Identity, 
285-286).
Bukatman concludes that science fiction must be understood in its importance to the 
present cultural moment as a narrative genre that has kept a more ambivalent 
perspective in regard to the structures of power that permeate and shape the spectacular 
society in which we live, as well as in regard to the master-narrative -  the technological 
creed and its stubbom myth of human control and voluntarism -  of late capitalism. 
Science fiction as a genre has made an effort to represent phenomenally the non-space 
created by cyber-technology, has addressed the emergence and hegemony of the 
spectacle as a way of ordering society, and has remained ambivalent in regard to it. In 
the 1950s, it resisted as a literary genre to the advent of the society of the spectacle and 
criticized the image addiction it creates as a disease; nowadays it has adhered to more 
ambivalent postmodem tactics that simultaneously involve acceptance and resistance to 
the powerfiilly controlling forces of the spectacle (Terminal Identity 69).
In his view, science fiction proposes that we are not condemned to be 
“buttonheads” by the society of the spectacle. Science fiction has thoroughly addressed 
the issue of the definition of the autonomy of human subject, which was traditionally 
anchored in the consciousness we have of our bodily existence. It has redefined the 
human body and the relationship of the human subject to his/her body. This redefinition 
has not redeemed or privileged the etemal soul, but has made the subject to be defined 
in terms o f a mutable body, a thinking mind, a recalling memory that is no longer 
opposite to a machine, but has, instead, become continuous in relation to the machine. 
It has created the myth of the cyborg -  a metaphorical subject redefined to permit its 
presence and existence as a biological being within an electronic world, and still 
retaining the older notion of the subject as being based on mastery of rather than
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symbiosis with the machine. Its language simultaneously expresses “the postmodern
crisis of a body that remains central to the operations of advanced capitalism as a sign,
but has become entirely superfluous as object” (because it is no longer a requisite for
the survival of the technocratic system), and retains the body and the organic as the sign
of an unchanged, non-terminal human existence (although often avoiding the realities of
reproduction and the presence of women), Bukatman describes concisely this
postmodern crisis of the body in the conclusion of his book;
What I have described in the preceding chapters is a set of fictions -  in literature, 
philosophy, cinema, television, comics, and theme parks -  that present a 
movement away from the traditional experience of the body and toward some 
sort of ecstatic activity of cybernetic fusion. The discourses of science fiction 
and philosophy have constructed a metaphorical subject redefined to permit its 
situation as a biological being within an electronic world. But this rarely occurs 
without a simultaneous retention of an older notion of the subject based on 
mastery rather than symbiosis, a subject that ultimately retains power through 
the displacement of cybemetic reconstruction. Within the fictions of terminal 
identity, the subject is brought to the limits of self-definition, but the 
metaphorical solutions to the problems posed by a postmodern existence often 
re-center subject power as an untested, unchanging, and eternal phenomenon 
(Terminal Identity 301).
Thus, the fianction of science fiction as a narrative genre can be conceived of as 
dramatizing the superimposition of technology on the human. Bukatman believes that, 
when doing so, science fiction narratives have challenged as well as reinforced the 
Westem technological creed and its central myth of the himian ability to control and 
overcome the machines man creates; they have challenged and reinforced the arguments 
used to describe, criticize and fear the emergence of the society of the spectacle. They 
have remained ambivalent and, therefore, tactical; they have created the myth of the 
cyborg, which represents a new form of utopia: a utopia that stresses the belief in being 
human and the possibility of remaining himian in spite of the supreme danger of 
technological dependence.
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I have considered two outstanding examples of the science fiction genre, 
keeping in mind the existence of a Westem technological creed -  the central belief of 
which is the affirmation of man’s mastery of technologies he creates -  and focusing on 
what they have to say with regard to the relationship between mankind and technology: 
Shelley’s novel Frankenstein and The Wachowski Brother’s fihn The Matrix. I have 
shown that they have at least a major feature in common: they deal with transitional 
ages, with transition as a social phenomenon, its ambiguous situations, and its marginal 
characters, I have also shown that their messages radically differ with regard the 
relationship between mankind and technology.
Frankenstein brings a dystopian view of the heavy dependence of our culture 
and our society upon technology and science. It renders its half-human and half­
machine monster in the sinister specter of the danger technology means to the human 
essence and relates the fixture hopes of mankind to a repression of the desire to control 
nature. In Shelley, this denial is expressed in a nostalgic attempt to bring to the new 
industrialized world the principle and values of pre-industrial societies. It treats the 
machine as the enemy of man. The Matrix, on the other hand, portrays a new world in 
which the hopes of mankind to keep control upon electronics, nanotechnologies, digital 
technologies, genetic engineering, mass media and worldwide webs of information 
technology are invested on a new breed of heroes: prosthetics and net-cyborgs -  i.e., 
half-human and half-machines heroes. It treats the machine as inseparable from human 
beings.
In the course of less than two centuries, the monster that haunted the imagination
♦
of the Westem society at the aftermath of the Industrial Revolution has become the hero 
it roots for in the brink of the Digital Revolution. The “thing” that, less than two 
centuries ago, was conceived of as ominous and frightening, because it brought together
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what should remain apart, now has been conceived of as paradigmatic for human 
behavior, because it finally brings together what had been erroneously kept apart. This 
change is crucial to imderstand our contemporary society and our relationships with 
technologies.
From Frankenstein to The Matrix there is still another significant difference. 
Mary Shelley exposed a radically dystopian view of the increasing human dependence 
upon technology. She devised a way through which man could recover his control upon 
the world: it was Victor’s and Walton’s denial of their technical and scientific conquests 
and of their search for social recognition and glory. Thus, she stated her fear of a world 
in which men would lose the control of their artifacts and she flirted with a world that 
had not been totally disenchanted yet: the rural world of the pre-revolutionary years. 
Certainly The Matrix denounces and condemns the spectacular society in which we live, 
but at least two reasons render its message more ambiguous with regard to the Westem 
technological creed. On the one hand, it endorses both a dystopian view of the society 
of the spectacle and the new utopianism that recovers the older utopian belief that man 
can, at the end, master its artifacts. Indeed, the film suggests that we have no way out of 
the technological spin in which we are swirling unless we become more technologically 
savant. On the other, the experiment in reader-response criticism I worked with my 
students shows that the criticisms towards the society of the spectacle that are contained 
in the dystopian view of The Matrix are not necessarily perceived by its audiences, 
which rephrase its messages so they become a reassurance of the Westem technological 
creed. Faith in science, it seems, is not unlike religious faith. Thus, unlike Bukatman, 
who emphasizes the tactics of evasion and resistance presented by the science fiction 
genre, I suggest that this genre has not only generated narratives that both strengthen 
and defy the prevailing cultural values and worldview, but has also allowed both
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strategic and tactical readings, utopian and dystopian views of life in an human world 
ridden by technologies.’
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NOTES:
’ Bukatman refers to Michel de Certeau’s conceptual distinction between 
“strategy” -  which means social praxis that create and reinforce hegemonic values, 
beliefs and views through which power and authority are exercised in society -  and 
“tactics” -  which mean social praxis that serve to evade hegemony and elude power, 
expressing the relative freedom of will and act human individuals possess.
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